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McVeigh, McJustice, McMedia
Stephen Jonest
and Holly Hillermantt
On April 19, 1995, all of America turned its attention to the
events that occurred in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, where the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building was destroyed by a massive
explosion resulting in the deaths of at least 168 men, women, and
children,1 nineteen of whom were under the age of six. More than
500 additional people were injured, and more than ten buildings
in downtown Oklahoma City destroyed, with property damage
approaching $1 billion.2 On April 21, Timothy James McVeigh
was arrested and charged with federal offenses in connection
with the explosion.'
t LL.B. University of Oklahoma, College of Law, 1966; Partner, Jones & Wyatt;
court-appointed lead defense counsel in United States v McVeigh.
tt BA . Oklahoma State University, 1993; J.D. University of Oklahoma, College of
Law, 1996; associate at Jones & Wyatt, Enid, Oklahoma.
"At least 168 men, women and children" died in the Murrah Building bombing. The
number is qualified because in 1995 the State Medical Examiner's Office claimed that 169
victims had died. As a result of defense inquiries, the Medical Examiner's Office acknowl-
edged in early Fall of 1995 that it had the left leg of a victim that could not be identified
with any other victim. Or, to put it another way, the Medical Examiner's Office had eight
victims with traumatically amputated left legs, but nine left legs. Ultimately, it was con-
cluded that the extra left leg belonged to Mrs. LaKesha Levy and her body was exhumed.
However, Mrs. Levy was buried with an unattached left leg. The left leg in her casket was
removed and given the number P-71. The earlier unidentified leg was matched to Mrs.
Levy and placed in her casket and she was re-buried. However, the dilemma was not
solved for the prosecution as it still had an extra left leg. After a series of lengthy, de-
tailed, and highly complex and sensitive examinations, it could not match the left leg to
any victim. The defense raised at trial that the extra left leg belonged to a bomber, and
called as a principal defense witness to advance this theory, Dr. T. K. Marshall, the re-
tired Chief State Pathologist for Northern Ireland. See Jo Thomas, McVeigh Defense
Team Suggests Real Bomber Was Killed in Blast, NY Times Al (May 23, 1997).
2 For information concerning the extent of the casualties and property loss, see City
of Oklahoma City Document Management Team, Final Report, Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building BombingApr 19, 1995 (Fire Protection Publications 1996).
' McVeigh was arrested by Oklahoma State Trooper Charles Hanger within two
hours of the bombing, north of Oklahoma City, one mile south of the Billings, Oklahoma,
exit on Interstate 35. McVeigh was initially charged with a series of misdemeanor of-
fenses, including carrying a concealed weapon, failing to possess proper insurance verifi-
cation, and failing to have license tags. He was held in the Noble County Jail where the
FBI located him on April 21st and subsequently arrested him on the federal complaint.
The state charges were dismissed the same day.
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At McVeigh's arraignment at Tinker Air Force Base on April
21, 1995, the Oklahoma City Federal Public Defender, Susan
Otto, represented the defendant. On Otto's motion, John Coyle,
an Oklahoma City lawyer who accompanied her to the arraign-
ment, was appointed as co-counsel. On the following Monday,
both Otto and Coyle moved to withdraw because of alleged con-
flicts of interest. Between April 24 and May 5, the Chief Judge of
the Western Judicial District, David Russell, considered the ques-
tion of counsel for McVeigh. On the evening of May 5, 1995,
Chief Judge Russell contacted me on behalf of the United States
District Court to ask whether I would agree to defend an individ-
ual who had been, or would be, charged in the Oklahoma City
bombing. On the following day, May 6, 1995, I informed Chief
Judge Russell I was willing to represent such an individual.4 On
May 8, 1995, pursuant to the Crimes & Offenses Act of 1790,' I
was appointed as McVeigh's counsel.
On August 10, 1995, an indictment was returned by the
United States Grand Jury for the Western District of Oklahoma
charging Timothy James McVeigh, Terry Lynn Nichols, and oth-
ers unknown, with one count of conspiracy to use a weapon of
mass destruction,6 one count of use of a weapon of mass destruc-
tion (a "truck bomb"),' one count of destruction by explosives,8
and eight counts of first degree murder of a federal agent.9 Pleas
of not guilty were entered by both McVeigh and Nichols on
August 15, 1995.
' For a more detailed background concerning my appointment and the reasons I
accepted the court's invitation see Stephen Jones, Others Unknown, Public Affairs (forth-
coming 1998).
Codified now as the Criminal Justice Act, 18 USC §§ 3005, 3006(A) (1994).
18 USC § 2332(a) (1994).
7 Id.
18 USC § 844(f) (1994).
18 USC §§ 1814, 1111 (1994). The indictment identified 160 deceased. One hun-
dred fifty-two were named in Count One, the "conspiracy count," and eight in Counts Four
through Eleven. The eight named separately were federal agents Mickey Bryant
Maroney, Special Agent of the United States Secret Service, Donald R. Leonard, Special
Agent of the United States Secret Service, Alan Gerald Whicher, Assistant Special Agent
in charge of the United States Secret Service, Cynthia Lynn Campbell-Brown, Special
Agent of the United States Secret Service, Kenneth Glenn McCullough, Special Agent of
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Paul Douglass Ice, Special Agent of
the United States Customs Service, Claude Arthur Medearis, Special Agent of the United
States Customs Service and Paul G. Broxterman, Special Agent of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development Office of Inspector General. Six individuals, who alleg-
edly died outside the Murrah Building, were not named in the indictment, because it was
assumed that they would be named in comparable Oklahoma State criminal prosecutions,
the exact contours of which were not then or now known.
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United States District Judge Wayne Alley received the case
pursuant to regular assignment on August 10, 1995, and on Sep-
tember 14, 1995, set the trial in Lawton, Oklahoma, approxi-
mately eighty miles southeast of Oklahoma City.'0 Judge Alley's
formal order found that it would be "chancy" to try to select a jury
from the Oklahoma City area." By notice filed October 21, 1995,
the government stated its intention to seek the death penalty
against McVeigh and Nichols. McVeigh moved on August 22,
1995, that Judge Alley recuse himself under 28 USC § 455(a) on
the grounds that his courtroom had been heavily damaged by the
bombing, his chambers had been slightly damaged, and one
member of his staff had received slight injury. In addition,
McVeigh alleged that Judge Alley, as a member of the federal
judiciary for the Western Judicial District, should be disqualified
because of close familiarity with persons who had been killed and
injured, and the "federal court family," itself, had been a victim."
Judge Alley denied the motion by formal order on September 14,
1995. Defendant Nichols, using facts developed by his, co-
defendant concerning the damage to Judge Alley's chambers and
courtroom, and other material, petitioned the Tenth Circuit for a
writ of mandamus requiring Judge Alley to recuse himself, and
the Circuit granted the writ."
The case was subsequently assigned to Chief Judge Richard
P. Matsch, District of Colorado on December 4, 1995. On October
25, 1996, the court granted the Defendants' Motion for
Severance'4 and ordered that the trial of McVeigh would occur
first, commencing on March 31, 1997. On June 2, 1997, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts against McVeigh and
"0 Oklahoma has three federal judicial districts, Western, Northern, and Eastern.
Lawton is the second largest city in the Western Judicial District, the third largest in the
state as a whole.
" United States v McVeigh, No CR-95-110-A at 20 (W D Okla filed Sept 14, 1995)
(order designating place of trial as Lawton, Oklahoma).
2 By "federal court family," we refer to the fact that various employees of the United
States District Court - housed in a building immediately south of the Murrah Building -
sustained minor cuts and injuries, and several of them lost close family or friends who
worked in the Murrah Building. For example, the daughter of a Deputy United States
Court Clerk was killed in the bombing, and Robert Dennis, Clerk of the United States
District Court for the Western Judicial District of Oklahoma, although uninjured, was
actually standing by the elevator in the Murrah Building when the bomb detonated. The
defense argued that it was inappropriate for a federal judge in the Western Judicial Dis-
trict to sit because so many members of the staff of the United States Court Clerk's Office
were victims - in one way or another - of the bombing.
13 Nichols v Alley, 71 F3d 347, 352 (10th Cir 1995).
4 United States v McVeigh, 169 FRD 362, 371 (D Colo 1996).
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unanimously recommended a sentence of death following a sen-
tencing hearing on June 13, 1997.
This Article does not address all of the legal issues or eviden-
tiary conflicts that arose in the prosecution of Timothy James
McVeigh for the murder of 168 fellow Americans. Instead, this
Article focuses on a number of First Amendment issues that
arose as a result of the collision of the First Amendment guaran-
tees of a free press, the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due proc-
ess of law, and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial by an
impartial jury. These issues relate to the change of venue as a
result of prejudicial publicity, the media's access to sealed docu-
ments, restrictions on extrajudicial statements because of public-
ity, broadcasting court hearings, and special arrangements for
the press during trial. Finally, this Article concludes that the
media's rush to report developments in the McVeigh trial could
not help but affect the fairness of that trial, and as a result,
robbed that trial of its historical credibility.
I. CHANGE OF VENUE AND THE IMPACT OF PREJUDICIAL
PUBLICITY
Soon after his grand jury indictment, McVeigh moved for a
change of venue out of Oklahoma on the grounds that the press
coverage and prejudicial publicity made it impossible for him to
receive a fair trial within the state.'6
At the hearing on the motion, McVeigh first demonstrated
that the volume, frequency, and prejudicial nature of media cov-
erage in Oklahoma was decidedly unlike the coverage outside the
state.' The defense submitted to the court well over a thousand
" Those subjects will be treated at length in a forthcoming article for the University
of Oklahoma Law Review and in a book to be published in late 1998. Copies of the motion
for New Trial and the Government's Reply, and a copy of the Appellate Brief and the Gov-
ernment's Opposing Brief may be obtained from the author for a reproduction fee.
" Changes of venue on the grounds of prejudicial publicity are rarely granted. As
with criminal trial issues, the trick is to find the case where the unusual has happened.
By reviewing appellate decisions and newspaper accounts, the defendants in this case
were able to find several federal criminal trials where changes of venue were granted on
the grounds of prejudicial publicity under Rule 12. See, for example, United States v
Moody, 762 F Supp 1485, 1487 (N D Ga 1991); United States v Abrahams, 453 F Supp 749,
753 (D Mass 1978); United States v Tokars, 839 F Supp 1578, 1584 (N D Ga 1993); United
States v Engleman, 489 F Supp 48, 51 (E D Mo 1980); United States v Holder, 399 F Supp
220, 228 (D SD 1975) United States v Marcello, 280 F Supp 510, 517 (E D La 1968).
," Defendant McVeigh's Brief in Support of Change of Venue at 43, United States v
McVeigh, 918 F Supp 1467 (W D Okla 1996) (No CR-95-110-MH) ("McVeigh Venue Brief").
This was demonstrated partly by the statements contained within the Oklahoma Depart-
ment of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services application for federal assistance.
Even those who had no connection to the site or to those who died or were injured were
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pages containing local broadcast news transcripts, newspaper
articles, and evidence of television programs giving detailed re-
ports relating to the bombing.8 Many articles assassinated
McVeigh's character by including statements that he was an "an-
archist,"9 that he was "stoic," "cold," and "paranoid,"20 and fit the
profile of an "authority killer."2' Most articles and broadcasts
that purported to detail evidence in the case did not question
McVeigh's involvement but took such as fact.22 Thousands of ad-
significantly exposed to the trauma through the media and the near total preoccupation
with the event and its aftermath. Local media focused exclusively on the bombing for
weeks following the incident. Between April 20, 1995, and October 30, 1995, 3,566 articles
concerning the case were published in Oklahoma's two largest newspapers, the Daily
Oklahoman and the Tulsa World. Contrast this number to the 317 articles carried in the
Denver Post. McVeigh Venue Brief at 4.
" McVeigh submitted with his motion four appendices containing the majority of the
Daily Oklahoman articles concerning the case, the Lawton Constitution articles, the Tulsa
World articles, and transcripts of local news broadcasts. These included 1,087 pages from
the Daily Oklahoman, 317 pages from the Lawton Constitution, 314 pages from the Tulsa
World, and 926 pages of transcripts from local television broadcasts. In addition, McVeigh
submitted a partial listing of prejudicial articles with a description of their contents from
each newspaper as exhibits to the motion. Id at 5-6.
Sara Gay Dammann, Bombing Suspects Chased from Militia, Group Says, Daily
Oklahoman 5 (Apr 24, 1995).
' John Parker, McVeigh Ordered to Trial in Bombing, Daily Oklahoman 1 (Apr 28,
1995).
" Criminologist Says Bomber Likely to Be "Authority Killer" Type, Lawton Constitu-
tion 7C (July 11, 1995).
' McVeigh Venue Brief. A few examples illustrate this point. A local television
broadcast stated: "Soon after Wednesday morning's bombing a 1977 yellow Ford Mercury
was driving northbound on Interstate 35. It was driving without plates. Inside the car
was a man that already devastated a nation and was about to change the small town of
Perry, Oklahoma." KOCO Channel 5 broadcast (Apr 21, 1995 at 10:00 pm). The Daily
Oklahoman indicated that the "government disclosed" that Timothy McVeigh told a friend
"something big is going to happen" and continued to report that "just before the explosion,
McVeigh and the other suspects screamed at each other, ran for McVeigh's car, then made
a U-turn in the street in front of the building and sped away. Investigators believe a sec-
ond car could have been waiting near-by." John Parker, Friend Puts McVeigh in City on
Easter: Bomb Suspect Talked about 'Something Big", Daily Oklahoman 1, 16 (Apr 27,
1995). Another article questioned whether McVeigh was alone in Oklahoma City (without
questioning if he was in fact there), or whether he was there with John Doe #2, or whether
there were more "like-minded extremists involved in the bombing of the federal building."
Associated Press, Puzzle Pieces Don't Always Fit Perfectly, Daily Oklahoman 12 (May 1,
1995). The Daily Oklahoman reported that "[hie rented a room at the Dreamland Motel
for Apr 14th-18th. Using a fake name, McVeigh and another man rented a mid-sized
truck in Junction City on Apr 17th." 5-State Search, Daily Oklahoman 9 (May 3, 1995). A
Tulsa paper quoted an NBC report citing law enforcement sources that 'stated that there
was a security camera video tape that showed the Ryder truck parked in front of the fed-
eral building with McVeigh in the truck. Julie DelCour, Agents Trace Suspect's Tracks,
Tulsa World N1 (May 9, 1995). In an article purporting to describe Timothy McVeigh, the
Tulsa World stated that
[r~estless, McVeigh left Kingman a few months later, only to come and go
several times through the year. The last time his blue Pontiac pulled out
of the town was April 12th. Five days later, he rented the yellow Ryder
rental truck that carried the bomb that blew up in Oklahoma City.
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ditional articles and television broadcasts extensively reported
McVeigh's identification by eyewitnesses, his purported plans to
conduct other bombings, physical evidence supposedly linking
him to the bombing, and leaks by "sources" detailing the grand
jury testimony of Michael and Lori Fortier, who implicated
McVeigh in the bombing.' Almost all of these reports contained
inaccuracies' or were statements of dubious origin because made
by federal officials speaking on condition of anonymity.' Indis-
putably, some of the "leaked" information also circulating in re-
ports was false.2" A mountain of other articles detailed the
Sally Jacobs, The Radicalization of Timothy McVeigh, Tulsa World C18 (June 10, 1995).
' McVeigh Venue Brief at 41-42. A few examples illustrate this point. The Daily
Oklahoman printed an article in which it maintained that the FBI told the newspaper
that McVeigh had been linked to the bombing by a chemical found on his clothes and car.
The article quoted a "source" as stating that at least one of four witnesses had picked
McVeigh out of a line-up and that the FBI reported that McVeigh used the aliases "Tim
Tuttle" or "Terry Tuttle" and that a man using the name "Terry Tuttle" had tried to buy
one hundred percent liquid nitrogen model airplane fuel at a hobby shop which could be
used to make an "improvised explosive." Chemical Tests Point to McVeigh: F.B.I. Theo-
rizes "John Doe 2" May Be Dead, Daily Oklahoman 1-2 (Apr 26, 1995). A statement made
by Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating declared that the evidence against McVeigh was
strong and stated that authorities investigating the bombing "got the first creep that did
it" and apparently are "moving in on the rest." Paul English, Bomb Investigators Got Rirst
Creep' Keating Says, Daily Oklahoman 1 (May 26, 1995). The last example is an article
that quoted extensively from testimony provided by Lori Fortier to the Grand Jury inves-
tigating the bombing case. Robby Trammell, Nolan Clay, and Randy Ellis, McVeigh Dem-
onstrated Bombing, Grand Jury Told, Daily Oklahoman 1 (Sept 3, 1995).
2' A television broadcast stated that "what may turn out to be the most crucial piece
of videotape is twenty-two seconds long. It shows McVeigh stopped in the Ryder truck on
Robinson Street, about five hundred feet east of the Murrah Building." KFOR broadcast
(May 8, 1995 at 10:00 pm). The videotape actually gave no indication of who was in the
truck. Similarly, a newspaper article indicating that the Daily Oklahoman had been told
that previous reports that McVeigh and Fortier inspected the building just days before the
bombing, were "wrong." Robby Trammell, Nolan Clay, Randy Ellis and Diana Baldwin,
McVeigh Put At Blast Site In December: Suspect Friend Cased Area, Daily Oklahoman 1
(June 17, 1995). A third example was a report on CNN that a list of aliases widely attrib-
uted to McVeigh by the media had been found in McVeigh's credit file, thus suggesting
that the reports of McVeigh's use of the aliases was true. The CNN story was false. The
only reason the aliases were in the credit file was because other media had been seeking
information from McVeigh's credit file by using his social security number and asking for
information on the aliases. The media inquiry actually created the record of the aliases in
McVeigh's credit file. See Julie DelCour, Lawyer Sees Charade, Tulsa World N9 (Aug 4,
1995); Julie DelCour, Defense Suggests Iran Link, Tulsa World N1 (Aug 9, 1995).
See, for example, Julie DelCour, Car Tag Is Still Missing, Tulsa World N1 (Apr 29,
1995).
See, for example, Brian Ford and Zira Branstetter, Brothers Charged- US Says
They Experimented With Bombs, Tulsa World N1 (Apr 26, 1995). The story, based on a
Washington Post front page story that ran on April 23, 1995, and stated that McVeigh
gave only his name, rank, and army serial number to FBI agents in the Noble County Jail.
Subsequently, the defense obtained a copy of the 302 memorandum of interview by two
FBI agents at the Noble County Jail, the only interview granted to the government by
McVeigh. The memorandum showed clearly that the conversation consisted of the FBI
asking questions and McVeigh refusing to answer on the grounds he wished to consult an
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trauma experienced by victims of the offense and their efforts at
physical and emotional recovery." Nichols, who also moved for a
change of venue, called Russell Scott Armstrong, a well-known
Washington, D.C. writer, who testified that all of Oklahoma was
one "news market" and that a fair and impartial trial could not be
held anywhere in the state.2" Armstrong found that the news
coverage in Oklahoma focused purposefully upon the needs of the
local audience, which were different from needs on the national
level.29 These differences were demonstrated by the sheer num-
ber of stories and the intensity and repetition of information pro-
vided in Oklahoma. ° In regards to this local news coverage bias,
Armstrong testified that "more neutral coverage is almost as-
sured anywhere other than Oklahoma.""1
Second, an opinion poll demonstrated a direct nexus between
the saturation of media coverage in Oklahoma and its prejudicial
effect upon its citizens, especially in the Lawton area from which
potential jurors would be drawn. Based on the results of the pub-
lic opinion poll conducted by Dr. Kent L. Tedin and Dr. Richard
Murray of the University of Houston, 2 the defense was able to
demonstrate a significantly heightened awareness about the facts
of the case within the confines of the state. More importantly,
McVeigh showed that 44 percent of those polled in the
Lawton/Magnum Division had formed an opinion as to the guilt
of McVeigh. Ninety-six percent of those with an opinion believed
McVeigh to be guilty.' Significantly, the poll indicated that the
intensity with which this opinion was held was dramatically
attorney, with the exception of routine and mundane questions such as height and weight.
At no point did the government memorandum reflect that McVeigh had given only name,
rank, and serial number, in fact, the memorandum clearly showed the opposite.
McVeigh Venue Brief at 19-22.
Transcript of January 31, 1996, hearing on venue at 314, United States v McVeigh,
918 F Supp 1467 (W D Okla 1996) (No CR-95-110-MH) ("Jan 31, 1996 Transcript").
Idat311.
' Id at 319. In April of 1995 the ratio of media coverage in Oklahoma City as com-
pared to Denver was five-and-one-half to one. By October of 1995 the ratio had risen to
seven-to-one. Id at 384.
Id at 362.
Four Hundred respondents were interviewed in the venues of the Lawton/Magnum
Division, Denver, Colorado, Kansas City, Kansas, and Albuquerque, New Mexico.
McVeigh Venue Brief at 22; Exhibit B thereto, Affidavit of Kent L. Tedin at 2.
' Over 80 percent of Lawton area residents could, without prompting, recall the
names of one or both defendants, whereas less than one half of the respondents in the out-
of-state venues could recall the names of either defendant. McVeigh Venue Brief at 22-
24; Exhibit B thereto, Affidavit of Kent L. Tedin at 17.
' This number was compared to 40 percent in Denver, 37 percent in Kansas City,
and 39 percent in Albuquerque. McVeigh Venue Brief at 23; Exhibit B thereto, Affidavit
of Kent L. Tedin at 6.
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higher in Lawton than outside the state.35 In addition, 70 percent
of the potential Lawton/Magnum jurors made a financial or per-
sonal contribution to the victims of the bombing, or knew, or had
family or friends who knew, someone killed or injured in the
bombing. Of the 30 percent who did not fit into that category, 42
percent had formed an opinion that McVeigh was guilty. Thus,
82 percent of the prospective jurors in this Division had indicated
that they had a close personal connection to the case or had
formed an opinion that McVeigh was guilty, and thus would
qualify as "for cause" challenges." At the hearing," Dr. Tedin
concluded that based on the data in the defense and government
surveys, it was extremely unlikely that McVeigh and Nichols
could receive a fair trial in Oklahoma.38 It was his contention
that although publicity was national, there was less exposure to
such publicity in venues outside of Oklahoma, and that the resi-
dents in out-of-state venues were less affected by publicity con-
cerning the aftermath (victim impact) of the bombing than were
residents in Lawton or Tulsa, Oklahoma (the government's first
choice for an alternate venue).39 Nichols also called Harold C.
Bodley, a private investigator, who testified to the constant re-
minders and involvement of the community in the bombing disas-
ter. Such reminders included bumper stickers, billboards, blue
ribbon pins, memorabilia, the chain link fence around the bomb-
ing site containing messages, small mementos, and the blue room
at the State Capitol displaying art work of survivors and family
members of the bombing."
Based on the quantitative and qualitative nature of the pub-
licity and its direct effect upon Oklahomans as evidenced by the
results of the opinion poll, McVeigh argued that juror assurances
of impartiality during voir dire could not be trusted, and that
prejudice should be presumed in order to guarantee his due proc-
ess rights under the Fifth Amendment.4' McVeigh principally
' Of those who believed McVeigh was guilty, 54 percent in the Lawton area were
absolutely confident in this belief compared to 18 percent in Denver, 23 percent in Kansas
City, and 44 percent in Albuquerque. McVeigh Venue Brief at 23; Exhibit B thereto, Affi-
davit of Kent L. Tedin at 7.
McVeigh Venue Brief at 24; Exhibit B thereto, Affidavit of Kent L. Tedin at 14 n 8.
Robert Nigh, Jr., primarily conducted the hearing on behalf of McVeigh. Other
defense attorneys participating included Stephen Jones and Richard Burr.
In the interim between filing the brief for change of venue and the hearing,
McVeigh conducted an additional public opinion poll in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Jan 31, 1996 Transcript at 454.
' Id at 249-296.
41 US Const, Amend V. McVeigh argued that in cases where the publicity was not
nearly as pervasive as in this case, prejudice was presumed. Even if the question were
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relied on Irvin v Dowd,42 Rideau v Louisiana,43 and Sheppard v
Maxwell." Collectively, these decisions recognize that when
there has been pervasive media coverage concerning a case that
has the effect of establishing the guilt of the accused, or when a
community has been so inflamed that there is a reasonable like-
lihood that a fair trial cannot be obtained, prejudice must be pre-
sumed." Moreover, in Coleman v Kemp, the Eleventh Circuit
held that when pre-trial publicity creates the impression that the
accused is guilty and there is considerable public passion con-
cerning the crime, the danger is great that fairness of the trial
will be compromised." Relying on Coleman, McVeigh argued that
the entire State of Oklahoma, for purposes of assessing the im-
pact of prospective jurors' relationships to the victims, was the
equivalent of the community in which Coleman was tried.47
McVeigh also relied on Marshall v United States," United
States v McNeil,49 United States v Moody,50 and United States v
Tokars,5" to argue that the District Court could use its federal
supervisory powers to grant a change of venue, prior to an at-
tempt to seat a jury, on facts showing less prejudice than those
required under Irvin, Rideau, or Sheppard." McVeigh recog-
posed to potential jurors, their assurances would not be dispositive. A defendant has a
right to demonstrate actual prejudice. Defendant McVeigh's Reply to Government's Re-
sponse to Motion for Change of Venue at 18-19, United States v McVeigh, 918 F Supp
1467 (W D Okla) (No CR-95-110-M) ("McVeigh Reply Brief), citing United States v Af-
fleck, 776 F2d 1451, 1455 (10th Cir 1985).
42 366 US 717, 725 (1961) (although potential jurors will have formed some impres-
sions in a highly publicized case, it was error to rely upon juror assurances of impartiality
where there was an overwhelming amount of publicity six to seven months prior to trial
and eight out of twelve jurors thought the defendant was guilty).
373 US 723, 727 (1963) (there was no need to examine the voir dire transcripts, as
prejudice is presumed where a local television station broadcast a video tape confession
lasting twenty minutes depicting interrogation by the sheriff and admissions by Rideau
that he had committed the robbery, kidnapping, and murder).
" 384 US 333, 362-63 (1966) (Sheppard's conviction for killing his pregnant wife was
reversed based on pervasive pre-trial publicity, which included statements to the press by
police concerning scientific evidence linking him to the crime which was never introduced
at trial).
4' McVeigh Venue Brief at 11-14.
778 F2d 1487, 1540 (11th Cir 1985) (Coleman's petition for a Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus was granted and his conviction reversed. The Eleventh Circuit explained that be-
cause "the press saturated the community with overwhelming evidence of Coleman's
guilt," and the entire community knew that the family of the victim pushed for the death
penalty, Coleman did not receive a fair trial).
, McVeigh Venue Brief at 30-31.
360 US 310 (1959) (per curium).
728 F2d 5 (1st Cir 1984).
762 F Supp 1485 (N D Ga 1991).
839 F Supp 1578 (N D Ga 1993).
McVeigh Venue Brief at 32-41.
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nized, however, that the majority of the federal cases rely on Rule
21(a),53 rather than the supervisory power, as the basis for
granting a change of venue. In applying this less stringent stan-
dard for a change of venue, McVeigh argued that several federal
district courts, which have granted transfers prior to jury selec-
tion, such as Moody,' United States v Abrahams,55 and United
States v Florio,6 have done so upon a showing much less compel-
ling than the showing he had made.57 Even in cases that at-
tracted national publicity, these cases establish that a court must
examine the impact of the publicity upon the local community,
considering whether government agents have been responsible
for prejudicial reports (thus giving them credence), and the
amount of "investigative reporting" undertaken by the media
(evidencing local interest). McVeigh contended that juror assur-
ances of impartiality mean little when daily news repeatedly de-
scribe the "facts" of the case. 8
Next, McVeigh argued that the government's intention to
seek the death penalty mandated a change of venue due to the
extensive and emotional local media coverage of victim impact.59
Relying on Woodson v North Carolina,° California v Brown,"' and
California v Ramos,62 McVeigh argued that if he were convicted,
he would be entitled to an individualized sentencing decision re-
flecting a "reasoned moral response to [his] background, charac-
ter, and crime," and that the jury would then have to make a
"death-worthiness" determination of him on the basis of this
evaluation." McVeigh argued that any attempt by the jury to
reach a moral response by conducting a searching examination of
the defendants and the circumstances surrounding the offense,
would likely evoke the feelings of pain, heartache, and the natu-
ral desire for retribution that Oklahomans uniquely felt. The
FRCrP 21(a).
762 F Supp 1485.
453 F Supp 749 (D Mass 1978).
13 FRD 296 (S D NY 1952).
" McVeigh Venue Brief at 32-41. See also United States v Engleman, 489 F Supp 48
(E D Mo 1980); United States v Holder, 399 F Supp 220 (D SD 1975); United States v
Marcello, 280 F Supp 510 (E D La 1968).
McVeigh Venue Brief at 33.
Id at 22-27.
428 US 280 (1976).
479 US 538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor concurring).
463 US 992 (1988).
McVeigh Reply Brief at 24, quoting Brown, 479 US at 545 (O'Connor concurring).
" This decision is recognized as differing greatly from the fact-laden guilt/innocence
stage. See McVeigh Reply Brief at 24.
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risk that passion and prejudice would infect the sentencing de-
termination would thus be too high and alone would justify a
change of venue.'
McVeigh demonstrated support for the existence of local me-
dia bias through an abundance of local newspaper articles and
television transcripts detailing the impact of the bombing on the
victims.' For example, for several days after April 20, 1995, the
Daily Oklahoman ran an entire section concerning victims enti-
tled "Together in the Heartland."6 The Daily Oklahoman carried
the obituary and a brief biographical description of each person
killed in the blast.' Numerous articles depicted accounts of chil-
dren who were left orphaned, parents who had lost children, and
countless others who had been maimed. They also described
their efforts at physical and emotional recovery after the bomb-
ing. Media coverage of these affecting accounts continued in
Oklahoma long after scenes from the rescue efforts had ceased in
the national media.69 McVeigh argued that any potentially quali-
fied juror within the state could not have ignored or set aside the
heart-wrenching reports concerning victim impact.0 In this way,
Oklahomans suffered the consequences of the bombing in a man-
ner that citizens of no other state did.7 ' On this basis, McVeigh
contended that he would be deprived of an individualized sen-
" Id at 29. See also Bomb Victims Help Pass Anti-Terrorism Bill, Daily Oklahoman
21 (June 11, 1995), quoting Senator Bob Dole:
The families of the bombing victims traveled all the way to Washington
this past Monday to let us know that we must take action now to put an
end to the endless delays and appeals that have done so much to weaken
public confidence in our system of criminal justice. It is gratifying to see
that their efforts had such a profound impact here in the Senate.
McVeigh Reply Brief at 7-19. McVeigh submitted 225 specific examples of victim
impact articles with his brief as Exhibits R through T.
The majority of these articles were contained in McVeigh Venue Brief at Appendix
Volume I.
Those Who Died, Daily Oklahoman 11 (Apr 25, 1995); Those Who Died, Daily Ok-
lahoman 11 (Apr 26, 1995); Carla Hinton, Bombing Victims Remembered, Eulogized, Daily
Oklahoman 20 (Apr 28, 1995); Together in the Heartland, Daily Oklahoman 19 (May 7,
1995); Those Who Died, Daily Oklahoman 8 (May 9, 1995); Those Who Died, Daily Okla-
homan 17 (May 14, 1995).
Jan 31, 1996 Transcript at 311-12. For a minute sample, see Anthony Thornton,
Missing Woman's Family Cling to Last Shred of Hope, Daily Oklahoman 9 (Apr 22, 1995);
Melanie Busch, Parents Remember Lives of Joyful Children, Tulsa World 1 (Apr 25, 1995);
Stress, Grief Blamed in Death of Blast Victim's Older Sister, Daily Oklahoman 14 (June 9,
1995); Pat Gilliand, Wife of Bombing Victim Travels to Site Where Husband Died, Daily
Oklahoman 13 (July 5, 1995); Wesley Brown, Survivors Deal with Their Pain, Tulsa World
I (Sept 9, 1995). These stories represent only a small fraction of the similarly themed
articles published in Oklahoma before the Change of Venue motion.
: McVeigh Venue Brief at 20.
, Id at 42-43.
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tencing hearing if convicted and sentenced by an Oklahoma
jury.72
From the other side, the government argued that Lawton
was a fair venue for the trial. The government relied on the the-
ory that it would not be possible to know whether McVeigh could
get a fair jury until voir dire had been completed. Relying onPat-
ton v Yount73 and United States v Pedraza,74 the government ar-
gued that voir dire was the established. and appropriate way to
determine any possible effects, such as bias, from pretrial public-
ity.75 The government argued that prejudice should not be pre-
sumed, as the media coverage had been mostly factual, had not
focused on the defendants but had focused upon the event,76 and
had extended nation-wide.7  Finally, a government-conducted
survey showed no significant difference in responses from Okla-
homa residents and residents in out-of-state venues.7' Thus, the
government contended, simply because all potentially qualified
Oklahoman jurors appeared to possess some knowledge or opin-
ion of the case, it did not presumptively mean that such jurors
could not be impartial. A "juror qualifies as 'impartial' if he or
she 'can lay aside [any] opinion and render a verdict on the evi-
dence presented in court."'7m
At the hearing, the governments relied upon the expert tes-
timony of Dr. Donald E. Vinson. Dr. Vinson testified that, based
12 Id at 43-45.
467 US 1025, 1038 (1984) (It is "fair to assume [that voir dire] - the method we
have relied on since the beginning - usually identifies bias."), citing United States v Burr,
25 F Cas 49, 51 (D Va 1807). See also Mu'Min v Virginia, 500 US 425 (1991); Murphy v
Florida, 421 US 794 (1975); Brief of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Mo-
tions for Change of Venue at 33, United States v McVeigh, 918 F Supp 1467 (W D Okla
1996) (No CR-95-110-A) ("Government Response to Venue Brief).
=' 27 F3d 1515, 1525 (10th Cir 1994) ("Whether a jury harbors prejudice related to
pretrial publicity is best determined during voir dire examination."). Government Re-
sponse to Venue Brief at 5.
" If the court was inclined to change the venue at all, the government argued that it
should be moved to Tulsa, in the Northern District of Oklahoma. See Government Re-
sponse to Venue Brief at 5, 33. Of great importance to the government was that Tulsa,
rather than an out-of-state venue, would allow victims to attend the trial in accordance
with their rights under the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 found at 42 USC
§§ 10606(b)(4), 10607(e)(2). Government Response to Venue Brief at 39.
Id at 20-24.
Id at 24-27.
78 Id at 6.
Government Response to Venue Brief at 6, quoting Patton v Yount, 467 US at 1037
n 12, citingIrvin v Dowd, 366 US 717.
' United States Attorney Patrick Ryan conducted most of the hearing on behalf of
the government. Other government attorneys participating included Joseph Hartlzer,
Jerome Holmes, Vicki Behenna, and Sean Connelly.
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on his survey,8' there were no statistically significant differences
across the venues tested concerning opinions of guilt or inno-
cence, or in the intensity with which such opinions were held. He
concluded that the amount of media exposure in Oklahoma was
irrelevant and that the defendants could receive a fair trial in
either Lawton or Tulsa. Dr. Vinson did conclude, however, that
this case would require very careful voir dire because many peo-
ple had already formulated prejudices against McVeigh and
Nichols.82
Judge Matsch entered his order on February 20, 1996.' He
initially noted that Judge Alley's finding that selection of an im-
partial jury from Oklahoma City would be "chancy" needed no
further discussion because of the "profound and pervasive" effect
of the bombing on that communitY' In addition, the court noted
that, based on the amount of time and expense needed to reno-
vate the facilities in Lawton, Oklahoma, it was not a practical
location for the trial." As a result, the court granted a change of
venue away from the Western District of Oklahoma."6
Next, Judge Matsch turned to a discussion of whether there
existed prejudice so great throughout the state that it would pre-
clude the trial from being held in Oklahoma. Judge Matsch spe-
cifically noted at this point that a "failed attempt to select a jury
would, itself, cause widespread public comment creating addi-
tional difficulty in beginning again at another place for trial."8"
In holding that no fair trial could occur in Oklahoma, the court
gave great deference to the defendants' exhibits and the expert
testimony of Armstrong, which collectively demonstrated the "dif-
ferences [that] developed in both the volume and focus of the me-
dia coverage in Oklahoma compared with local coverage outside
of Oklahoma and with national news coverage." 9 Not only was
Dr. Vinson surveyed Albuquerque, Denver, Kansas City, Tulsa, and Lawton.
Transcript of January 30, 1996, hearing on venue at 170, United States v McVeigh,
918 F Supp 1467 (W D Okla 1996) (No CR-95-110-MH) ("Jan 30, 1996 Transcript"). On
cross-examination, Vinson testified that individual jurors hold attitudes that are a source
of bias and they rely upon biased attitudes and beliefs. He admitted these go far beyond
anything that can be discovered in voir dire. Id at 203-04.
McVeigh, 918 F Supp 1467.
Id at 1470.
Id.
Id.
McVeigh, 918 F Supp at 1470. Despite the defendants' arguments that they did
not have to prove prejudice in the Northern District, the court, noting that selection of an
alternate venue is at its discretion, considered Tulsa based on the express wishes of the
victims made through government counsel. See also US Const, Art III, § 2, cl 3.
McVeigh, 918 F Supp at 1474.
Id at 1471.
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the coverage of the explosion more prevalent in Oklahoma during
the weeks following the bombing, but the Oklahoma media con-
tinued to focus on the explosion and its aftermath long after the
national media had begun to focus purely on factual reports con-
cerning the investigation.' The court found that "most signifi-
cant was the continuing coverage of the victims and their fami-
lies."91 The court explained that the "Oklahoma coverage was
more personal, providing individual stories of grief and recovery
[and that as] late as December 1995, television stations in Okla-
homa City and Tulsa were broadcasting special series of individ-
ual interviews with family members and people involved in cov-
ering the explosion and its aftermath." 2 The court noted:
According to Armstrong, these differences reflect the dif-
ferent needs of the Oklahoma media market compared to
the nationwide media market. He observed that, as a na-
tional story of great importance, people across the country
wanted to know the "who, what, where, why and when" of
this event. The nation was interested in the human story
of suffering and renewal, but in a more general sense. In
contrast, because this was a crime that occurred in their
state, Oklahomans wanted to know every detail about the
explosion, the investigation, the court proceedings and, in
particular, the victims.93
The court accepted Armstrong's opinion that "these greater
informational needs of Oklahomans resulted from a perception
that Oklahomans are united as a family with a spirit unique to
the state.' This theme was prominent in newscasts, statements
made by the political leaders of the state, commemorative books
and pamphlets, and in interviews of rescue workers and common
citizens throughout the state. 5 Additionally, Judge Matsch found
Oklahomans exhibited pride in all that had been accomplished in
the struggle to regain "normalcy," and that the final focus of re-
covery was on participation in the trial.9" This feeling of pride,
however, could easily result in prejudice:
" Id.
91 Id
McVeigh, 918 F Supp at 1471.
Id.
' Id.
Id at 1471-72.
McVeigh, 918 F Supp at 1472.
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The prejudice that may deny a fair trial is not limited to a
bias or discriminatory attitude. It includes an impairment
of the deliberative process of deductive reasoning from
evidentiary facts resulting from an attribution to some-
thing not included in the evidence. That something has its
most powerful effect if it generates strong emotional re-
sponses and fits into a pattern of normative values."
Given the repetition of highly emotional stories concerning the
victims and their families, the "prevailing belief that some action
must be taken to make things right again," and the fact that Ok-
lahomans overwhelmingly viewed the role of court proceedings as
"'seeing that justice is done,'" the court explained that "there is a
fair inference that only a guilty verdict with a death sentence
could be considered a just result in the minds of many."8
Finally, the court focused on whether there had been "a
showing of a predilection toward [the death] penalty."9 The court
noted that this is a necessary inquiry once the issue of prejudice
has been raised, as the "sentencing jury must be prepared to
make a moral judgement which is individual to the particular
defendant after consideration of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances specifically as to him," "l° and jurors "who would
automatically vote for or against it must be excluded."'' The
court then stated:
Most interesting in this regard is the frequency of the
opinions expressed in recent televised interviews of citi-
zens of Oklahoma emphasizing the importance of assuring
certainty in a verdict of guilty with an evident implication
that upon such a verdict death is the appropriate punish-
ment. It is significant that there is a citizens' movement
in Oklahoma to support pending legislation which would
" Id.
Id.
Id at 1474.
'c' McVeigh, 918 F Supp at 1474. The court did not give a lengthy discussion of the
opinion polls conducted by the defendants and the government, stating that "[sluch sur-
veys are but crude measures of opinion at the time of the interviews." Id at 1473. The
court argued that properly instructed jurors could normally be fair in a case that has
received extensive media coverage, however, "trust in their ability to do so diminishes
when the prior exposure is such that it evokes strong emotional responses or such an
identification with those directly affected by the conduct at issue that the jurors feel a
personal stake in the outcome." Id. It then suggested that a "community point of view"
may instill "a sense of obligation to reach a result which will find general acceptance in
the relevant audience." Id.
"I Id at 1473, citing Morgan v Illinois, 504 US 719 (1992).
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sharply limit the reviewability of a death sentence. °2
Based on the foregoing findings, after giving consideration to
the wishes of the victims,0 3 Judge Matsch granted a change of
venue to Denver, in the District of Colorado. The court held that
the "court's obligation to assure that the trial be conducted with
fundamental fairness and with due regard for all constitutional
requirements" outweighed the victims' interest in attending the
trial in Olahoma.'°  The court selected Denver,1°5 because it
found the city to possess many community resources, an adequate
airport, well-suited court facilities, adequate security services,
and a large available jury pool."°c McVeigh moved for another
change of venue after the Dallas Morning News Internet story of
February 28, 1997. That incident will be discussed in Part IV.
II. EFFORTS OF THE MEDIA TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO SEALED
DOCUMENTS
Another issue that arose almost immediately in the case was
media access to hundreds of pleadings filed under seal. Many of
these pleadings were sealed without any type of description as to
their contents, simply stating on the docket sheet "SEALED
document [number] (IN VAULT)." The "Media
Representatives" 07 objected to this procedure, filing a Motion to
Unseal Previously Sealed Documents, which argued that all fied
10 McVeigh, 918 F Supp at 1473.
10 The court did consider the amicus curiae brief on behalf of the victims at the hear-
ing. Id at 1474-75.
10 Id at 1475.
10 Id at 1474, citing Tokars, 839 F Supp 1578; Moody, 762 F Supp 1491.
10 McVeigh, 918 F Supp at 1474.
107 "Media Representatives" included 1) Combined Communications Corporation of
Oklahoma, Inc, (d/b/a KOCO-TV); 2) Media Group (FOI Oklahoma, Inc, Associated Press,
Daily Oklahoman, Tulsa World, KFOR-TV Channel 4, KWTV Channel 9, KJRH Channel
2 (Tulsa), Society of Professional Journalists Oklahoma City Chapter and Society of Pro-
fessional Journalists Eastern Oklahoma Chapter); 3) Dallas Morning News; and 4) Na-
tional Media Group (American Broadcasting Cos, CBS, Inc, FOX News, Inc, National
Broadcasting Co, Inc, Cable News Network, Inc, Chronicle Publishing Company (d//a San
Francisco Chronicle), New York Times Company, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc (d/b/a
Philadelphia Inquirer and Philadelphia Daily News), Providence Journal Company (d/b/a
Providence Journal-Bulletin), KING-TV (Seattle), KGW-TV (Portland), WCNC-TV (Char-
lotte), WHAS-TV (Louisville), KHNL-TV (Honolulu), KASA-TV (Albuquerque), KMSB-TV
(Tucson), KREM-TV (Spokane), KTVB-TV (Boise), Seattle Times Company (d/bla Seattle
Times), Washington Post, Inc, and Time, Inc). Each group filed a separate motion and
brief requesting the unsealing of previously sealed documents and establishment of future
sealing procedures, but later joined together in filing one reply brief and argued the mo-
tion jointly at the hearing.
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court documents are presumptively open to the public.' They
maintained that in the event any proceedings or documents are to
be closed or sealed, the public should be given notice and an op-
portunity to object. If, after the parties have been required to
demonstrate justification for sealing or closure, the court then
rules in favor of closure, the court should make specific findings
on the record to support its decision'19 as outlined by the Fourth
Circuit in In re Washington Post Co."'
The Media Representatives based their position on the com-
mon law right of access to court documents,"' the qualified First
Amendment right of access to court proceedings," 2 and the exten-
sion of this qualified First Amendment right to court
documents."3 The Media Representatives argued that in all cir-
cuit courts of appeal that have addressed the issue of closure or
sealing, "(1) the proponent... must establish a 'compelling' com-
peting interest that outweighs the First Amendment right of ac-
cess; (2) the limited access must be both 'necessary to and effec-
tive in protecting' [that] interest[;] and (3) the limitation adopted
[must be] the least restrictive means [available]. " 114
In his reply brief to the Media Representative's motion,
McVeigh first noted that the Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed whether there is a First Amendment right of access to
court documents. Second, McVeigh rejected the media's conten-
tions that the Tenth Circuit has applied a First Amendment right
"O Brief Supporting Motion of Combined Communications Corporation of Oklahoma
to Open Sealed Documents and to Direct Applicable Procedures for Further Orders Seal-
ing Documents, United States v McVeigh, 918 F Supp 1452 (W D Okla 1996) (No CR-95-
110-A) ("Media Representatives Open Sealed Documents Brief").
Media Representatives Open Sealed. Documents Brief at 8.
807 F2d 383,390-91 (4th Cir 1986).
"' Media Representatives Open Sealed Documents Brief at 2, citing Nixon v Warner
Communications, Inc, 435 US 589, 597 (1978).
... Id at 4-9, citing Press-Enterprise Co v Superior Court, 464 US 501, 509-510 (1984)
("Press-Enterprise 1") (right of access to jury voir dire) and Press-Enterprise Co v Superior
Court, 478 US 1, 10 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise 11") (right of access to preliminary hearing).
"' See Associated Press v United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia, 705 F2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir 1983) (First Amendment Right applies generally to all
pretrial documents); Seattle Times Co v United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington, 845 F2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir 1988) (documents relating to pretrial
detention hearings). Reply of Media Parties Relating to Motions to Unseal Records and to
Establish Procedures at 6, United States v McVeigh, 918 F Supp 1452 (W D Okla 1996)
(No CR-95-110-A) ("Media Representatives Open Sealed Documents Reply Brief"), citing
In re New York Times, 828 F2d 110, 114 (2d Cir 1987) ("Other circuits that have addressed
this question have construed the constitutional right of access to apply to written docu-
ments submitted in connection with judicial proceedings that themselves implicate the
right of access.").
... Media Representatives Open Sealed Documents Reply Brief at 10-11.
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to these documents."5  Although recognizing the common law
right of access to documents, McVeigh objected"' to the unsealing
of any previously sealed documents on the basis that the court
had already made its determinations to seal a number of them in
order to protect his rights to a fair trial,"7 and others based on
preservation of "higher values.""8 Particularly, McVeigh objected
to the unsealing of documents filed pursuant to the Criminal Jus-
tice Act ("CJA7), which covered the vast majority of documents
under seal. These documents related to applications and orders
for interim fees and support services for defense attorneys made
under the CJA,"' which gives special consideration to capital de-
fendants.2 ° The documents, CJA Form 30 for compensation for
counsel and CJA Form 31 for expert and other services, were
sealed by order of Judge Russell because they contain protected
attorney work product, 2' such as detailed descriptions of services
performed, dates of service, and time billed. Relying on United
States v Suarez,'22 McVeigh additionally argued that there is no
"tradition of accessibility" to the type of information contained
within the CJA applications. In fact, Congress explicitly provided
that applications for services must be made ex parte and in cam-
era12 to protect the rights of the defendant and the character of
his defense. Unsealing these documents would not only divulge
attorney work product but also give a "blueprint" of the defense
strategy, 25 depriving McVeigh of an opportunity to present a
meaningful defense as guaranteed by Washington v Texas 2 and
11 Brief in Support of Defendant McVeigh's Response to the Media Movants' Motion to
Unseal Previously Sealed Documents at 2, United States v McVeigh, 918 F Supp 1452 (W
D Okla 1996) (No CR-95-110-A) ("McVeigh Response to Open Sealed Documents Brief"),
citing United States v Hickey, 767 F2d 705, 709 (10th Cir 1985). Press-Enterprise I is inap-
plicable as to the question of a constitutional right of access to court files and documents
because that case deals generally with the issue of closed pre-trial and trial proceedings.
McVeigh Response to Open Sealed Documents Brief at 3-4.
117 Id at 9.
118 Id, citing Sealed Document 143 at 25.
1 18 USC § 3006(A) (1994).
1 21 USC § 848q(9)-(10) (1994).
121 United States v McVeigh, No CR-95-110-A, (W D Okla June 7, 1995) (order sealing
documents).
1 McVeigh Response to Open Sealed Documents Brief at 6, citing United States v
Suarez, 880 F2d 626, 631 (2d Cir 1989).
1 McVeigh Response to Open Sealed Documents Brief at 6, citing 18 USC §
3006(A)(e)(1) (1994) and 21 USC § 848(q)(9) (1994).
12 McVeigh Response to Open Sealed Documents Brief at 7, citing 1964 USCCAN
2990, 2990; Suarez, 880 F2d at 632.
1 McVeigh Response to Open Sealed Documents Brief at 12.
12 388 US 14, 19 (1967).
McJUSTICE
Crane v Kentucky.'27 Thus, documents pertaining to CJA activi-
ties may be judicially placed under seal or otherwise safeguarded
until all judicial proceedings in the case are completed and for
such time thereafter as the court deems appropriate. 28
Subsequent to the Media Representatives filing their mo-
tions and prior to the hearing, the parties reached a compromise
under which many of the documents were unsealed. 9 In addi-
tion, the court stipulated that the parties sort each document into
specific categories for the purposes of the hearing.3 The bulk of
these documents related to CJA matters, all of which defendants
objected to the court unsealing. The Media Representatives did
not seek disclosure of documents relating to non-counsel applica-
tions for services, recognizing that federal guidelines specifically
call for the sealing of such documents to protect defense strategy
and tactics.' They also conceded that disclosing specific infor-
mation on counsels' vouchers for payment as to services provided
would reveal defense strategy.'32 Based on Nichols's argument
that revealing time records would allow government counsel to
determine defense strategies,'33 the Media Representatives addi-
tionally conceded that such information should remain sealed."
Notwithstanding these concessions, the Media Representa-
tives sought disclosure of filed documents detailing the gross
amount paid to defense counsel over the suggested period of every
127 476 US 683, 690 (1986).
McVeigh Response to Open Sealed Documents Brief at 7, citing VII Guide to Judi-
ciary Policies and Procedures: Miscellaneous Proceedings § 5.01 (1993).
' Some documents about which there was no dispute were unsealed on Nov 3, 1995.
Transcript of December 13, 1995, hearing at 8, United States v McVeigh, 918 F
Supp 1452 (W D Okla 1996) (No CR-95-110-A) ("Dec 13, 1995 Transcript"). These catego-
ries included CJA documents and Rule 17(b) and (c) subpoenas. Id at 35-36. Addition-
ally, the media requested the court to establish particular "classes" of documents that all
documents would fall under one class for documents that would presumptively be sealed;
one class for documents that would presumptively be partially sealed; and a third class for
the rest of the documents that would require the defendants to make a request to seal the
document pursuant to procedures to be established by the court. Id at 47.
Id at 9, 12.
1 At the hearing, Nichols argued that revealing the time records of counsel would
allow the government to determine defendants' defense strategy by figuring out who was
working on what and how much time they spent on it. Dec 13, 1995 Transcript at 21-24.
1" Id at 23-24. Nichols took the position that there was not a tradition of accessibility
to these CJA documents and that disclosure of such information would not play a signifi-
cant positive role in the functioning of the particular process, not only for the reasons
expressed by McVeigh concerning criticisms of defense counsel based upon the cost of the
defense, but also because it would allow counsel for the government to determine what the
defense was doing. Consequently, where neither the tradition of accessibility nor a posi-
tive role can be found, the court should not reach the question of whether there is a com-
pelling interest shown by the defendants to mandate sealing the documents. Id at 21-24.
" Id at 30-31.
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two to four weeks.'35 The media argued that the public had a le-
gitimate interest in the amount of tax dollars spent to provide a
defense for the defendants, and that the issue was one of "height-
ened First Amendment interest during the time of the proceed-
ings. ""' Although interest in these records may linger indefi-
nitely, the information quickly becomes stale if not released at
the time of trial.'37 The Media Representatives argued that "the
limiting factor is not how interested the public is, but at what
point this disclosure begins to impinge on [ ] counsels' right to
plan his defense strategy in private."' They also sought to have
all documents, even if they were to remain sealed, described in
general terms on the docket, so the press and public could deter-
mine if they wished to object to sealing of the relevant
document."9
McVeigh's position was that disclosure was proper after final
disposition of the case, suggesting that the only intended purpose
of such information could be to "excite the public unfairly"
through a public debate about the cost of the defense. Such a dis-
cussion could prejudice McVeigh and might interfere with the
effectiveness of counsel."' The media responded by arguing that
the First Amendment requires the disclosure of such information,
regardless of underlying motives, and that voir dire could screen
out potential jurors who might have been prejudiced by the un-
sealing of such information.'
Judge Matsch's ruling on this issue provided a framework for
all future requests for sealing of documents and closure of pro-
ceedings in the case, as well as for subsequent objections. Con-
cerning all applications and orders for payment of interim fees
and support services to attorneys, Judge Matsch decided to keep
sealed and to seal all future applications and orders automati-
cally. Judge Matsch focused the discussion on the need for se-
Dec 13, 1995 Transcript at 12.
13 Id at 11, citing In re Application and Affidavit for a Search Warrant, 923 F2d 324,
331 (4th Cir 1991).
" Dec 13, 1995 Transcript at 11-12.
.. Id at 12.
Id at 38-44.
Id at 19-21. McVeigh provided the court with a specific example - an editorial in
the Daily Oklahoman that addressed the defense lawyers as: "Bogus. Stupid. A waste of
time. An insult to law-abiding Oklahomans." Addressing the exhibits supporting the
motion for change of venue, the editorial advised: "Perhaps defense lawyers should spend
less time clipping newspapers and taping TV broadcasts at public expense and spend more
time preparing for trial." Editorial, One More for the Lawyers, Daily Oklahoman 4 (Dec 5,
1995).
.. Dec 13, 1995 Transcript at 19-21.
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crecy and denial of public access to criminal pre-indictment inves-
tigations, grand jury proceedings, and defense investigation and
trial preparation.' He concluded that an indigent defendant's
use of CJA funds for his defense in no way undermines the right
to keep legal costs private. The court further ensured such pri-
vacy by requiring the indigent defendant to file applications ex
parte and in camera.43
In support of his decision not to release documents referring
to defense counsel's fees and costs, Judge Matsch cited Press-
Enterprise Co v Superior Court ("Press-Enterprise I),' T as rec-
ognizing a qualified right of access to court proceedings, but
holding this common law right subject to the supervisory powers
of each individual court. He explained that although historically
there has existed a general policy of openness at criminal pro-
ceedings, the "experience and logic" test may show that publicity
may threaten a defendant's right to a fair trial, and in those cases
the defendant's rights will override the qualified First Amend-
ment right of access. Closure is also permitted in cases where it
would be "essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest."'45 Significantly, however, denial
of access is not restricted to the defendant's protection from
prejudicial pre-trial publicity.4 ' Consequently, Judge Matsch
concluded that although the public possessed a legitimate inter-
est in the amount of public funds expended for the defense,'47
"[t]he timing of the disclosure is also a significant factor in the
balancing of the affected interest. The stage of the proceedings
may determine the questions of access."'
In reaching its decision, the court conflated the common law
right of access with the qualified First Amendment right of access
to court documents. Applying the standards of Press-Enterprise
II, the court created five questions to determine whether previ-
ously sealed documents would be unsealed and future documents
sealed:
Does the matter involve -activity within the tradition of
free public access to information concerning criminal
prosecutions? Will public access play a significant positive
142 United States v McVeigh, 918 F Supp 1452, 1457-60 (W D Okla 1996).
' Id at 1460-62.
1, 478 US 1 (1986) (see note 112).
145 McVeigh, 918 F Supp at 1463.
Id at 1463-64, citingPress-Enterprise II, 478 US at 9 n 2.
McVeigh, 918 F Supp at 1465.
.. Id at 1464.
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role in the activity and in the functioning of the process?
Is there a substantial probability that some recognized in-
terest of higher value than public access to information
will be prejudiced or affected adversely by the disclosure?
Does the need for protection of that interest override the
qualified First Amendment right of access? Is the closure
by the court essential to protect that interest, considering
all reasonable alternatives?"9
The court found that applications and orders for payment of
interim fees and support services for defense counsel are not
documents directly related to the "process of adjudication" and
therefore are "not within the strong presumption of open access to
proceedings in court."15 ° The court distinguished Suarez,5' find-
ing no tradition of access to such documents "while the investiga-
tion and preparation for trial are in progress."'52 This holding
was supported by the fact that such applications are made ex
parte and in camera to protect privileged information." Ac-
knowledging that defense strategies and tactics would be com-
promised by revealing services performed by the attorneys, Judge
Matsch recognized the additional interest of "protect[ing]... ap-
pointed counsel from vilification and accusations of improper mo-
tivations in the conduct of their responsibilities in the representa-
tion of these defendants. " " The court reasoned that, due to
counsels' inability to respond or explain,'55 any "robust debate"
concerning defense would divert counsels' attention away from
preparation of trial and adversely affect "the effectiveness of de-
fense counsel and fairness of the trail process."'56 In addition, the
court found that to reveal only the gross amounts of payments
would result in "emphasiz[ing] costs without any information
149 Id.
1" Id at 1465. The court compared the documents to pre-sentence reports that have
historically been secret for policy reasons, citing United States v Corbitt, 879 F2d 224, 229
(7th Cir 1989), cited with approval in In re Search of 1638 E. 2nd St, Tulsa, Oklahoma,
993 F2d 773, 775 (10th Cir 1993); Times Mirror Co v United States, 873 F2d 1210, 1219
(9th Cir 1989) (search warrants and supporting affidavits).
'5' 880 F2d at 632-33.
1 McVeigh, 918 F2d at 1464. The Suarez court affirmed a district court's order to
release CJA payments to the press in a non-death penalty case when the jury had already
been selected and the trial was in progress. "The same policy considerations were not
present at that stage of the proceedings and the case did not have the heightened sensi-
tivity of this case." Id at 1465.
Id at 1464.
1 Id at 1465.
Id.
16 McVeigh, 918 F2d at 1465.
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about benefits obtained. Public access to these cost figures would
be detrimental, not helpful, to the functioning of the court at this
stage of the proceedings."" 7 Finally, Judge Matsch ordered that
all future CJA filings must give a very brief description on the
docket indicating generally for which defendant the document
was filed and for what purpose.5 ' No other documents would be
presumptively sealed. The court then established procedures for
seeking future sealing or closure orders.'59
Each party followed these procedures through to trial. When
the media objected to sealing documents or closure of any pro-
ceeding, it was afforded a public hearing in which to voice its ob-
jections, and the defendants and government were provided an
opportunity to argue their respective positions. As a result of this
process, the "media""0 subsequently appealed three of Judge
Matsch's rulings to seal documents to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. These documents were: 1) Nichols' Motion to Suppress
Unlawfully Obtained Evidence and accompanying exhibits; 2)
"Government Exhibit 72" ("Exhibit 72") (FBI agent notes of Nich-
ols's interview on April 21-22, 1995); and 3) Defendants McVeigh
and Nichols' Severance Motions.' 6'
First, the media again argued that the press and public have
a common law and a First Amendment right of access to the
documents in question derived from the rationale of Press-
Enterprise 11 and its subsequent application to court records.6 2
Although the suppression hearing did not exist at common law,
several courts have found a First Amendment right to suppres-
sion hearing motions and exhibits. 1" Contained within Nichols's
'" Id at 1465.
Id at 1467. Two examples given by the court include: '§ 848(q) application for
interim fees for counsel,'" and -application for travel."
'" Id. The court ruled first that the party would have to file a motion setting forth the
reasons for seeking a secrecy order consistent with the court's analysis and that such
motion be filed publicly. Second, until the motion was ruled on, the submitted filing would
be kept under seal. Third, except in cases of an emergency referred to in the motion itself,
the court would not rule on the motion for at least three business days and any objections
within that time would be considered by the court. When a closure order was proposed, a
notice would be displayed in the clerk's office. Any objections had to be made on or before
the date set, at least three days after the day of the notice. All objections would be heard
in open court.
" Appeal was filed by Dallas Morning News, Colorado-Oklahoma Trial Group and
Colorado-Oklahoma Print Media Group. An amici curiae brief was filed by The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Newsday, and the Los Angeles Times. -
"' Brief of Appellants, United States v McVeigh, 119 F3d 806 (10th Cir 1997) (Nos 96-
1409, 96-1464) ("Media Representatives Appeal Brief).
Id at 15-18.
Media Representatives Appeal Brief at 18-20, citing In re New York Times Co, 828
F2d at 116; United States v White, 855 F Supp 13, 17-18 (D Mass 1994).
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exhibits were search warrants and affidavits that traditionally
have been open to the public after indictment to provide a check
upon law enforcement activities."
Second, the media argued that no court has found severance
proceedings, which are trial-like proceedings and constitute a
critical part of the criminal process," analogous to suppression
proceedings." Thus, the media contended that documents intro-
duced at the severance hearings should be disclosed to the public.
In this instance, they argued, the documents introduced were as
important to an understanding of the issues,"6 as attendance at
the hearing itself."e
Third, the media contended that the court should not make
an ad hoc decision of what it thinks the public needs to know, but
should engage in a First Amendment analysis of the issues before
making such a determination.'69 The media then argued that the
"district court failed to engage in the necessary substantive
analysis, failed to make specific, constitutionally required find-
ings supporting the sealing[,] and failed to consider alternatives
to sealing, such as voir dire and admonishments to the jury."'7
In support of these contentions, the media argued that the court
and parties had erroneously objected to unsealing the documents
on the basis that they contained discovery material, work prod-
uct, or information that was inadmissible at trial. Relying on
Rushford v New Yorker Magazine,7' the media contended that
once such information is placed before the court and is necessary
in rendering the court's decision, it loses any privacy interests it
may have once had and is subject to the criteria of Press-
Enterprise I. 2 Furthermore, the media asserted that prejudicial
publicity is insufficient to overcome the First Amendment right of
access and that the court must find that such publicity would
'" Times Mirror Co, 873 F2d at 1215; In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Out.
side Office of Gunn, 855 F2d 569, 573 (8th Cir 1988).
Media Representatives Appeal Brief at 20-21.
Id, citing United States v Criden, 675 F2d 550, 555 (3d Cir 1982) ("First Amend-
ment is to be interpreted in light of current values and conditions").
"v Media Representatives Appeal Brief at 32-34, 38-41.
Reply Brief of Appellants at 10, United States v McVeigh, 119 F3d 806 (10th Cir
1997) (Nos 96-1409, 96-1464) ("Media Representatives Appeal Reply Brief").
" Transcript of Oct 3, 1996, hearing at 333-34, United States v McVeigh, 119 F3d 806
(10th Cir 1997) (Nos 96-1409, 96-1464) ("Oct 3, 1996 Transcript").
' Media Representatives Appeal Brief at 13.
7 846 F2d 249, 252 (4th Cir 1988) ("Discovery, which is ordinarily conducted in pri-
vate, stands on a wholly different footing than does a motion filed by a party seeking ac-
tion by the court.").
1 Media Representatives Appeal Reply Brief at 16-18; Oct 3, 1996 Transcript at 333.
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create a "substantial probability" that the defendants could not
receive a fair trial in order to justify maintaining the seal.'73
In response to the media's arguments, McVeigh expanded
upon his previous position that there is no First Amendment
right of access to pretrial court documents.' McVeigh relied in
part on the dissent in Applications of NBC v Presser,75 which fo-
cused on the Supreme Court's "self-evident" knowledge of the dif-
ferences between a First Amendment right of access to docu-
ments and a First Amendment right of access to court proceed-
ings, and the Court's refusal to extend that right to documents. 6
In further support of his position, McVeigh relied on two analo-
gous cases, Seattle Times Co v Rhinehart77 and Nixon v Warner
Communications, Inc,'78 in which the Court held that the press
does not have a First Amendment right to inspect and copy court
records.'79 Although McVeigh conceded the legitimacy of the me-
dia's line of authority in other circuits, he pointed out that it was
one that the Tenth Circuit had never adopted."8  Relying on
United States v Corbitt8' and the dissent in Application of
NBC,"'5 McVeigh additionally argued that if a First Amendment
' See Media Representatives Appeal Brief at 27-30.
174 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has ever recognized such a right.
Brief of Defendant-Appellee Timothy James McVeigh in Support of Chief Judge Richard
P. Matsch's Orders at 11-23, United States v McVeigh, 119 F3d 806 (10th Cir 1997) (Nos
96-1409, 96-1464) ("McVeigh Appellee Brief').
828 F2d 340, 348-49 (6th Cir 1987) (Ryan dissenting) ("To put it plainly, (Press-
Enterprise I] has nothing to do with documents of any kind; it has to do with a claimed
constitutional right to be present at a state preliminary hearing in a multiple murder
case.").
"1 McVeigh Appellee Brief at 12-13, quoting Presser, 828 F2d at 350-51 (Ryan dis-
senting) (citations and footnotes omitted).
'" 467 US 20, 33-34 n 19 (1984) (no First Amendment right to pretrial depositions
and interrogatories sealed by the court because "to the extent that courthouse records
could serve as a source of public information, access to that source customarily is subject
to the control of the trial court").
"' 435 US at 610 ("The First Amendment generally grants the press no right to infor-
mation about a trial superior to that of the general public.").
7 McVeigh Appellee Brief at 13-14.
15 Id at 14-15, citing Lanphere & Urbaniak v Colorado, 21 F3d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir
1994) ("We begin here by noting once again that there is no general First Amendment
right in the public to access criminal justice records.").
151 879 F2d at 229
("The right of access to documents submitted for use in a hearing must be
considered separately from the press's right to attend the hearing itself..
. Whether or not the public and the press have a First Amendment right
to access to sentencing hearings, we must determine independently
whether there is a right to disclosure of pre-sentence reports submitted at
such hearings ... [and there is thus no right] to pre-sentence reports.").
18 828 F2d at 348 (Ryan dissenting) (a claimed constitutional right to examine and
copy the motion papers is analytically distinct from the claim of a constitutional right to
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analysis is applied to the right of access to pretrial documents,
such analysis must be considered separately from the right of
access to the pretrial proceedings themselves. McVeigh also
noted that some federal circuit courts that found a First Amend-
ment right to attend the proceedings, have applied either a condi-
tional right to the documents submitted in connection with the
proceeding"s' or applied the Press-Enterprise II two-prong analy-
sis."'4
McVeigh found that the cases cited by the media in support
of its position, which recognized a First Amendment right of ac-
cess to the pretrial documents in question, were distinguishable.
These cases involved either sealed documents in which no public
hearing was held,'85 a blanket sealing order implemented without
any type of First Amendment analysis," or a ruling in which the
court simply stated that the First Amendment applied in order
for the public to understand the proceedings. 181 In contrast to
these cases, Judge Matsch had conducted public hearings in
which the media were allowed to voice its objections to sealing,"4
applied a First Amendment analysis per his Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order of January 24, 1996, considered the least restric-
tive means by requiring redacted public filings, and held open
court hearings where witnesses testified and counsel argued
publicly, thus allowing all individuals to gather a basic under-
standing of the issues involved. Finally, Judge Matsch issued
thorough written opinions."9
be present at the hearing at which those motions were presented and decided).
McVeigh Appellee Brief at 16, citing Corbitt, 879 F2d at 229 n 4 (citations omitted).
lu McVeigh Appellee Brief at 16, citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 US at 8 (the first
prong is whether the process was historically open to the public, and the second is
whether public access plays a significant positive role in the fimctioning of the particular
process in question).
" McVeigh Appellee Brief at 18, citing In re New York Times, 828 F2d at 114 (access
to pre-trial motions is particularly important where no hearing is held and the ruling is
made solely upon the sealed motion papers).
" McVeigh Appellee Brief at 19, citing Associated Press, 705 F2d at 1147 (where
District Court ordered wholesale sealing of all pleadings without notice or opportunity to
be heard, Ninth Circuit instructed district court to make specific findings on an item-by-
item basis).
" McVeigh Appellee Brief at 20, citing United States v White, 855 F Supp 13, 15 (D
Mass 1994) (public has a qualified First Amendment right of access to hearings on mo-
tions to suppress and documents because without such access, the public often would not
have a "full understanding" of the proceedings and therefore would not always be in a
position to be an "effective check on the system" (citations omitted)).
" Transcript of June 29, 1996, Suppression Hearing at 1069-84, United States v
McVeigh, 169 FRD 362 (D Colo 1996) (No 96-CR-68-M) ("June 29, 1996 Transcript"); Oct
3, 1996 Transcript at 329-36.
" McVeigh Appellee Brief at 29.
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In addressing specific documents, McVeigh argued that the
affidavits and search warrants (and related documents) used to
establish probable cause should remain sealed because the inves-
tigation was ongoing, because grand jurors had indicted others
unknown, and because unsealing documents would violate
McVeigh's and Nichols's privacy rights. Although the Second
Circuit ultimately rejected the same argument as applied to the
facts of In re New York Times,9 ' McVeigh and Nichols argued
that to unseal the severance pleadings would cause a chilling ef-
fect to their defense strategies. They would be encouraged, the
defendants argued, not to include materials central to a reasoned
judicial decision, through fear that they would invite substan-
tially damaging pretrial publicity. 9'
McVeigh also argued that Exhibit 72 was properly sealed as
Judge Matsch found that this document contained information
inadmissible at McVeigh's trial.'92 Judge Matsch carefully con-
sidered the prejudicial effect of this exhibit prior to ordering it
sealed. The court considered alternatives to sealing at the sup-
pression hearing when Judge Matsch suggested Exhibit 72 be
redacted to maximize the First Amendment interests in accor-
dance with the court's earlier sealing order.'93 The media ob-
jected, however, which ironically resulted in the sealing of the
document in its entirety after the severance hearing."
" 828 F2d at 114-16 (acknowledging that his argument "is a substantial one," but
ultimately rejecting it on the facts of that case).
McVeigh Appellee Brief at 22; Oct 3, 1996 Transcript at 338.
Specifically, Judge Matsch found the statements did not meet the criteria of admis-
sibility under the applicable hearsay exception and would violate the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. He made these determinations after considering all the
evidence at the suppression hearing, and as with the other redacted and under seal docu-
ments, ordered Exhibit 72 to be sealed as well. McVeigh Appellee Brief at 33.
" In Judge Matsch's October 25, 1996 Order, in which he ruled that portions of the
severance motions should remain sealed, he again incorporated by reference his January
24, 1996, Order that applied the Press-Enterprise I standards. United States v McVeigh,
169 FRD 362, 365 (D Colo 1996). See also Oct 3, 1996 Transcript at 339-40. He stated
that the motions should remain sealed as "they refer to discovery material and include
attorneys' assessments of that material and statements of their respective positions in
anticipation of trial." Id at 337-38. Moreover, Judge Matsch clearly based his ruling on
the information disclosed at the public hearing and the redacted public filings, as he also
stated "[w]hile the sealed material has been helpful to establish context, the factual basis
for the findings and conclusions supporting this order are fully disclosed in this memoran-
dum opinion." McVeigh, 169 FRD at 364. Therefore, the documents were necessary to the
public's understanding of the proceedings, and Judge Matsch ruled that the portions that
were redacted should remain under seal as they contained information inadmissible
against McVeigh. Id.
" Transcript of June 27, 1996, Suppression Hearing at 384-86, United States v
McVeigh, 169 FRD 362 (D Colo 1996) (No 96-CR-68-M) ("June 27, 1996 Transcript"). At
the hearing, counsel for McVeigh pointed out that timing of sealing and unsealing Exhibit
72 should be considered:
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In contrast, the government's position195 was that McVeigh
and Nichols had not shown that disclosure would result in harm,
and that the District Court had not made the specific on-the-
record findings mandated by other circuit courts that have ap-
plied the First Amendment standards to pre-trial documents.19
Specifically, the government argued that pre-trial publicity alone
did not mandate sealing documents and objected to the use of
"work product" as a reason for sealing documents that have been
filed upon opposing counsel. In addition, the government main-
tained that McVeigh and Nichols had not shown that the District
Court had considered other alternatives to sealing such as
screening for prejudice through voir dire or jury admonishments.
The government concluded, however, that there may be sufficient
reasons for continuing to keep the documents under seal and that
the District Court should be given the opportunity to make such
findings prior to any directive to unseal the documents.197
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the media's writ on July 14,
1997.198 In its ruling, the court first addressed whether it had
previously found a First Amendment right of access to judicial
records. After evaluating its past decisions in United States v
Hickey19 and Lanphere & Urbaniak v Colorado,2°" the court
stated that it had not yet decided the issue. Further, by finding
that Judge Matsch's orders satisfied the First Amendment stan-
dards of Press-Enterprise II as adopted in his January 24, 1996,
The court has undertaken certain steps after very careful and thoughtful
review to balance, on the one hand, the First Amendment right of the
public and the press, and on the other hand, the absolute necessity that
at some time we're going to try this case and we'll have to empanel a jury
that should not take forever to seat. And the more something is repeated
in the press, the more it becomes accepted wisdom that it is true and the
more difficult it is to vacate from the human mind .... And as the Court
itself said, often, the question is one of timing. If, on the other hand, the
court should rule that they should not be admitted into evidence, then
they should not be in the public record so the public's right to know what
is in here if the court determines that it should come in, should come in
at the appropriate time after the jury is seated.
June 27, 1996 Transcript at 1065. (Stephen Jones's argument).
" Under the policy of the Attorney General, "Department of Justice attorneys are to
oppose closure of criminal proceedings unless sealing is appropriate and necessary to
serve specified interests, such as to overcome a substantial likelihood of denial of a fair
trial right." Brief for Appellee United States at 10, United States v McVeigh, 119 F3d 806
(10th Cir 1997) (No 96-1409).
' Id at 17.
. Id at 15-18.
" United States v McVeigh, 119 F3d 806,815 (10th Cir 1997).
767 F2d 705 (10th Cir 1985).
21 F3d 1508 (10th Cir 1994).
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Order, the court reasoned that the less-protected common law
right of access would also be satisfied. Therefore, for purposes of
its opinion, and without deciding the issue, the court stated it
would assume that Press-Enterprise II governs access to judicial
documents. In addition, the court emphasized that Judge
Matsch's orders must be examined in:
the extraordinary context of this case as a whole. A high-
profile case such as this imposes unique demands on the
trial court, and requires the court to establish procedures
for dealing effectively, efficiently and fairly with recurring
issues such as whether documents should be placed under
seal or redacted.2"'
In addressing the suppression motion and exhibits, the
Tenth Circuit found that, because the suppression hearing has
historically been open and is an important check upon law en-
forcement, the First Amendment analysis would be applicable to
the suppression motion."2 However, relying on United States v
Gurney,0 ' In re Globe Newspaper Co,2 ' and Pell v Procunier,°5
the court found that "the right of access to suppression hearings
and accompanying motions does not extend to the evidence actu-
ally ruled inadmissible in such a hearing."2" The court stated
that "[a]ccess to inadmissible evidence is not necessary to under-
stand the suppression hearing, so long as the public is able to un-
derstand the circumstances that gave rise to the decision to sup-
press."0 7 Moreover, "disclosure of such evidence would play a
negative role in the functioning of the criminal process, by ex-
posing the public generally, as well as potential jurors, to in-
criminating evidence that the law had determined may not be
used to support a conviction."2 8 In addressing the suppression
documents at issue, the Tenth Circuit concluded that sealing
McVeigh, 119 F3d at 813.
Id, citing Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 46 (1984).
558 F2d 1202, 1210 (5th Cir 1977) ("Tlhe press has no right of access to exhibits
produced under subpoena and not yet admitted into evidence, hence not yet in the pubic
domain.").
' 729 F2d 47, 54 (1st Cir 1984) (the constitutional right of access does not apply to
inadmissible evidence).
417 US 817, 834 (1947) ("[Tihe Constitution does not... require government to
accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public gener-
ally.").
McVeigh, 119 F3d at 813.
2" Id.
2m Id.
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those portions "was necessary to protect the integrity of the order
that the statements at issue constituted inadmissible hearsay or
were otherwise inadmissible."2 9  Additionally, because Judge
Matsch:
held a four-day long public suppression hearing, issued a
publicly available order, and made available to the public
redacted versions of the motions to suppress and attached
exhibits .... [B]oth the press and the public had ample
opportunity to understand the circumstances surrounding
Nichols' statements, and the reasons why those state-
ments were deemed inadmissible against McVeigh. °
The Tenth Circuit applied the same reasoning for holding
that Exhibit 72 was properly sealed.21' In addressing the sever-
ance documents,2 2 the court held that Judge Matsch had cor-
rectly balanced the interests of all parties in deciding to redact
the motions, as the defendants were forced to discuss candidly
their trial strategies and the strengths and weaknesses of their
case in order to show their defenses were mutually exclusive.
Moreover:
Granting general access to such documents would create a
Hobson's choice between the need to obtain severance and
the need to protect the client's interest in avoiding preju-
dicial pre-trial publicity. Although the redactions were
substantial, the District Court believed the redactions
were necessary to avoid chilling the sort of candor needed
to assess whether separate trials were necessary.213
Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that Judge Matsch had made
specific on-the-record findings, adequate for a reviewing court to
support his sealing orders for all three documents, even though
such findings would not have been necessary for Exhibit 72 or the
redacted portions of the suppression motions that were actually
suppressed.1 4 The court found that Judge Matsch's references to
his prior January 24th Order, his specific findings that the sup-
2W Id.
21W McVeigh, 119 F3d at 813-14.
211 Id at 814.
22 The Tenth Circuit again expressed that it would only assume for purposes of its
opinion in this case "that the First Amendment right of access applies to at least some
portions of the severance documents." Id.
213 Id, citing In reNew York Times, 828 F2d at 114.
"' McVeigh, 119 F3d at 814 n 5.
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pression documents contained "references and attachments
which are not now and may never be in evidence,' and that dis-
closure 'would likely generate pre-trial publicity prejudicial to the
interests of all parties in this criminal proceeding" satisfied
Press-Enterprise H1.215 The order regarding the severance motions
also referenced Judge Matsch's prior January 24th Order and
found a "chilling effect" that satisfied the applicable standards.216
The Tenth Circuit found that the orders were narrowly tailored
and that alternatives to sealing "had already been exhausted by
the time the orders were entered or were ongoing processes util-
ized by the court to try to protect the defendants' right to a fair
trial from the substantial publicity that was occurring." 7 Lastly,
the court conducted its own in camera review of the documents
and concluded that the District Court had properly sealed only
the portions of the documents necessary, realizing that at a later
time they may be unsealed if appropriate.2"8
The media petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court, contending that the Court should grant certiorari to decide
"whether the First Amendment right of access extends to docu-
ments filed in connection with criminal pretrial proceedings."' 9
The government opposed granting certiorari. McVeigh did not
fie a response to the petition for writ of certiorari because the
government's opposition raised all the issues in response that he
would have raised, and the Tenth Circuit refused to authorize
expenditures to respond to the petition for a writ of certiorari.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari on February 23, 1998.220
HI. GAG ORDERS AND ACCESS TO DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS
Two other First Amendment issues that arose were whether
to preclude the dissemination of discovery documents to the me-
dia,22" ' and whether to seal references to such documents in court
215 Id at 815.
218 Id. The court found that once the motion was submitted the "work product" doc-
trine was probably inapplicable but that the district court's discussion of it was helpful in
explaining the rationale behind the closure order.
217 Id.
218 McVeigh, 119 F3d at 815.
211 See Brief of the United States in Opposition at 10, United States v McVeigh, 119
F3d 806 (10th Cir 1997) (No 96-1409), quoting Brief of Petitioner at 9.
' Dallas Morning News v United States, 118 S Ct 1110 (1998).
"' As documents obtained in discovery are not filed in the proceedings, they are sub-
ject to neither the First Amendment nor common law rights of access. See In re Alexander
Grant & Co Litigation, 820 F2d 352, 355 (11th Cir 1987) (documents collected during
discovery are not "judicial records," and thus, despite a right of access to documents "duly
filed," the media does not have a common law right of access to information collected
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filings. Judge Alley addressed the first issue when he signed an
Agreed Discovery Order that contained a protective order provi-
sion:
Discovery materials may be disclosed only to the parties,
their counsel and agents, except that such materials may
be disclosed as necessary: (a) during court proceedings, in-
cluding trial, hearings or legal filings in this case; or (b) to
potential witnesses, provided that such witnesses are
made aware of and agree to honor the terms of this protec-
tive order.2"
From the inception of this case, however, there were continu-
ous leaks to the press from "anonymous sources." These leaks
pertained to discovery documents that, when disseminated and
used selectively, became misleading and highly prejudicial to
both defendants. One particularly egregious leak led the court to
formulate a policy for sealing discovery documents and to initiate
a "gag order."
When it was discovered that witness statements and a sum-
mary of the records of Daryl Bridges' calling card 4 had been
"leaked" to the press, Nichols requested an in camera hearing
and an appropriate order on the basis that the release of such
information violated Judge Alley's earlier protective order.'
through discovery which is not a matter of public record); United States v Anderson, 799
F2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir 1986). In addition, there are regulatory provisions limiting what
information may be released publicly by attorneys. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2. Judge Matsch
pointed out that the government has internal procedures restricting disclosure. See Dec
13, 1995 Transcript at 54.
2 See United States v McVeigh, No CR-95-110-A (W D Okla Aug 22, 1996) ("Agreed
Discovery Order"). See also United States v McVeigh, 918 F Supp 1452, 1459-60 (W D
Okla 1996) (a court may use its authority to impose restrictions to ensure "the fairness of
the proceedings and to emphasize that trials are conducted inside the courtroom under the
supervision of the presiding judge rather than on the courthouse steps. The news media
and the public are spectators, not participants, in the process of adjudication."); Seattle
Times Co v Rhinehardt, 467 US 20, 32-34 (1984) (First Amendment does not enjoin a
court from entering protective orders).
See United States v McVeigh, 931 F Supp 756, 760 (D Colo 1996) (ordering that no
lawyer or person associated with a lawyer could release or authorize the release of infor-
mation if there was reasonable likelihood that such disclosure would interfere with a fair
trial; and that all court supporting personnel were prohibited from disclosing to any per-
son, without authorization by the court, any information relating to the case that was not
part of the public record of the court).
The government's theory was that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols used Daryl
Bridges's calling card in furtherance of the conspiracy.
' See Terry Nichols' Motion for Hearing on Violation of Protective Orders and of
Other Obligations at 1, United States v McVeigh, 931 F Supp 756 (D Colo 1996) (No 96-
CR-68-M) ("Nichols Brief').
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Nichols contended that the telephone records were wholly incom-
plete, which would result in prejudice to Nichols from any public
discussion of them."' Nichols also contended that there was evi-
dence that the government had leaked the information with the
specific intent to connect Nichols to McVeigh because the gov-
ernment was "stung by evidence in the public record that Nichols
had severed connections with McVeigh."227 Nichols relied on Ne-
braska Press Association v Stuart,2" Sheppard v Maxwell," and
Gentile v State Bar of Nevada,"o in seeking an inquiry by the
court and appropriate standards for restrictions of counsel."3
The government opposed an in camera hearing to make fur-
ther inquiry into the leaks, 2 arguing that it would burden their
efforts in preparing for trialY Instead, the government re-
quested an order modifying the Agreed Discovery Order to pro-
hibit parties from making discovery a material part of their pub-
lic pleadings without prior court approvalY4 The government
asserted that the leaks were consistent with a pattern of dis-
semination of information to the press after documents had been
turned over to the defendants" - the implication being that the
defendants were responsible for selectively leaking information
highly prejudicial to themselves. In addition, relying on Gannet
Co v DePasquale,6 Sheppard,"7 and Gentile,"8 the government
= Id. With the assertion that the public is most prejudiced by stories that purport to
give the "whole story" of disputed facts, counsel for Nichols stated that "[tihe 'leaks' con-
sist of information which, while very detailed and copious, is disturbingly incomplete. The
media then weave the tantalizing strands together and create stories that purport to be of
whole cloth. In a mighty moment of marketing hubris, the media then call this product
'investigative journalism." Nichols Brief at 3.
See Declaration of Michael E. Tigar at 1-2, attached to Nichols Brief.
427 US 539, 564 (1976) (citing with approval the ABA study on fair trial and free
press) (noting that an effective means of ensuring a fair trial is to limit what attorneys
and police may say).
384 US 333, 359 (1966) (approval of use of orders restricting comments of counsel
and police).
501 US 1030, 1075-76 (1991) (attorneys may not say anything which would lead to
a "sulbtantial likelihood of material prejudice").
"' Nichols Brief at 2-3.
' The government denied any prosecutorial misconduct, relying upon an independent
investigation. See Response of the United States to Defendant Nichols' Motion for Hearing
on Violation of Protective Order at 2, United States v McVeigh, 931 F Supp 756 (D Colo
1996) (No 96-CR-98-M) ("Government Response to Nichols Brief').
' Transcript of April 30, 1996, hearing in chambers (sealed) at 33, United States v
McVeigh, 931 F Supp 756 (D Colo 1996) (No 96-CR-68-M) ("Apr 30, 1996 Transcript").
z Government Response to Nichols Brief at 8-9.
Id at 2-7.
443 US 368, 378 (1979) ("trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to
minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity").
' 384 US at 361.
.. 501 US 1030.
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sought a broader order restricting public comments by counsel on
the premise of protecting the parties' rights to a fair trial. 9 The
basis for such an order centered on an attack on McVeigh's coun-
sel for previous extrajudicial statements, claiming they had jeop-
ardized the fairness of the impending trial.24
Although McVeigh did not object to an inquiry into the
source of the leaks on either side's legal team, he did oppose a
hearing. He argued that it would be impossible to investigate all
government employees privy to such information, that such an
investigation would detract from trial preparation, and it would
result in all parties denying that they had leaked the information
without resolving the issue.24' Given the prejudicial nature of the
leaks, McVeigh contended that it should be clear that neither he
nor Nichols were responsible for the violation. McVeigh con-
tended that the government's argument also ignored the hun-
dreds of oral prejudicial statements leaked to the media by gov-
ernment officials and the fact that discovery documents in the
possession of McVeigh, which were damaging to the prosecution's
case, had not been leaked to the press.242
Accordingly, McVeigh opposed the government's proposal to
seal filings of witness statements at this point in the proceedings,
because it would unfairly "prevent any sense of balance being
maintained in the prospective jury pool."243 McVeigh opposed the
government's proposed "gag order" and argued that such an order
would be unenforceable against the prosecution given the hun-
dreds of government officials who had been actively involved with
the case. McVeigh contended that the government favors gag
orders because they are impossible to enforce against prosecutors,
but are effective against the smaller and more self-contained de-
fense teams.2' Moreover, even if such an order were effective, the
government had numerous surrogate speakers for the govern-
ment and natural allies of the prosecution to interject prejudicial
comments and information into media coverage of the trial.245
Additionally, McVeigh argued that because of the constant and
' Government Response to Nichols Brief at 7-9. This position was the direct opposite
of that taken by the government at the change of venue hearing.
Id at 3-7.
4 Apr 30, 1996 Transcript at 26-29, 38-39.
242 See Response of Defendant McVeigh to Motion for Hearing on Violation of Protec-
tive Order and Proposed Order at 9 n 6, 29, United States v McVeigh, 931 F Supp 756 (D
Colo 1996) (No 96-CR-68-M) ("McVeigh Response to Nichols Brief").
Id at 29.
Id at 12-13; Apr 30, 1996 Transcript at 37.
2 McVeigh Response to Nichols Brief at 13-17.
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endless leaks of information prejudicial to McVeigh,24 any order
restricting comments by counsel would "substantially hinder
counsel's ability to zealously represent McVeigh... [who] stand
alone in representing his interest and do so in the face of an
overwhelming chorus of public opinion which has presumed
McVeigh to be guilty of the offenses charged and which clamors
for his death. 47 Relying on Rule 3.6(c) of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct24 and Gentile,249 counsel for McVeigh stressed
that it was their ethical obligation to respond and try to amelio-
rate the unprecedented adverse publicity that had already re-
sulted in a change of venue.eo
The court entered its order on June 13, 1996,"' and found
that to conduct a public hearinge 2 would "necessarily destroy
th[e] confidentiality" of the discovery documents. 3 Further,
news coverage of such a hearing "would focus on the personalities
of the advocates and deflect attention from their advocacy of the
important legal and factual issues" and "necessitate an undue
expenditure of time and money."' A thorough investigation
would have to include "all of the persons in the federal, state and
local law enforcement agencies who have had any part in the in-
vestigation as well as their superiors."" Judge Matsch acknowl-
edged the efforts of defense counsel to generate countervailing
publicity and to obtain personal publicity for McVeigh in order to
allay the "demonization effects of the early camera coverage of his
arrest and detention." 8 Quoting Justice Kennedy's plurality
opinion in Gentile,"' to justify its previously lenient stance to-
2" Prior to my appointment as counsel for McVeigh, no fewer than 125 newspaper
articles were published containing prejudicial information leaked by the government.
Overall, more than 487 articles contain information purportedly leaked by government
officials. Id at 9-10. See also Declaration of Scott Anderson, attached thereto as Exhibit
6.
24 See McVeigh Response to Nichols Brief at 17.
2 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(c) (American Bar Association Center
for Professional Responsibility 1994).
24' 501 US 1030.
McVeigh Response to Nichols Brief at 17, citing Gentile, 501 US at 1043 ("[An
attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a clienfs reputation and reduce the adverse
consequences of indictment.").
2 United States v McVeigh, 931 F Supp 756 (D Colo 1996).
22 Although the parties requested an in camera hearing, Judge Matsch was "doubtful
that any such court hearing could be closed to the public." Id at 759.
2" Id.
2m Id.
McVeigh, 931 F Supp at 759.
Id at 758.
Id, citing Gentile, 501 US at 1042 for the proposition that:
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door. He or she
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wards extrajudicial statements by counsel,s the court neverthe-
less decided to implement a "gag order" and restrict public filings
of discovery. 9
The court did not, however, find any particular party in vio-
lation of the protective order. Judge Matsch explained that
"[s]ince the court does not have access to the discovery documents
and materials there is no way to independently judge the allega-
tions that some of the information and misinformation being dis-
tributed came from copies of documents disclosed under the rules
of reciprocal discovery." ° Moreover, the court was willing to ac-
cept that, although the reports appeared to indicate attorneys as
the source of such information, there were other possible sources,
including investigative journalism efforts, which could have inde-
pendently uncovered some of the same material.261 The court de-
cided not to investigate past disclosures of discovery documents,
because it did not think it would satisfy the parties and would
detract from trial preparation.2 The court explained that "[t]he
best method of avoiding prejudicial pretrial publicity is to mini-
mize the time necessary for preparation for the trial by requiring
all participants to focus their energy on that effort."263 The Order
restricted counsel and their associates from making any type of
disclosure or comment that would "interfere with a fair trial...
or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice."26 The
restrictions did not prevent counsel from "referring without com-
ment to public records," from discussing other general trial topics
cannot ignore the practical implications of a legal proceeding for the cli-
ent. Just as an attorney may recommend a plea bargain or civil settle-
ment to avoid the adverse consequences of a possible loss after trial, so
too an attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's reputation
and reduce the adverse consequences of indictment, especially in the face
of a prosecution deemed unjust or commenced with improper motives. A
defense attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an
indictment or reduction of charges, including an attempt to demonstrate
in the court of public opinion that the client does not deserve to be tried.
McVeigh, 931 F Supp at 758.
Id at 759-61.
Id at 759.
21 Id. The court also considered other sources, including government investigators
who had interviewed thousands of witnesses and investigators for the defendants. Ear-
lier, Judge Russell had dismissed a grand juror who was purportedly "leaking" informa-
tion to a reporter for the Daily Oklahoman. See Lee Hancock, Grand Juror Faces Sanc-
tions; He Gave Interview During Bombing Case Deliberations, Dallas Morning News 32A
(Oct 18, 1995).
McVeigh, 931 F Supp at 759.
Id.
Id at 760.
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such as scheduling, or from explaining legal issues without ex-
pressing opinions.2"
The court then ordered all parties to avoid reference to dis-
covery documents that would reveal their source or content. The
court ordered that if attaching discovery documents or making
reference to them was necessary in order for the parties to pres-
ent their position fully, they should submit those portions of the
documents under seal.2"
The court entered a second restriction on extrajudicial state-
ments in the third week of jury selection on April 16, 1997. The
court orally modified its Order and entered a complete bar on
statements made by counsel and their respective staffs. The de-
fendants and two media groups objected and oral argument was
heard.
Nichols argued that Gentile allows a defense attorney pub-
licly to speak critically of the government in the process of de-
fending his client, even after the trial has started.2 6 Nichols re-
lied on the Comments to ABA Rule 3.6 for the position that the
order should be modified to allow the defendants the right to re-
ply, particularly if the "demonization" of the defendants "gets out
of hand." In addition, Nichols argued that the Comments to
Model Rule 3.6 suggest that prosecutors should be more guarded
than defendants.2"
McVeigh argued that neither the Supreme Court nor any
other court has ever endorsed a restriction on extrajudicial
statements as sweeping as the one imposed by the court. The
order, argued McVeigh, was overbroad as to the defendant.
McVeigh argued that Gentile "endorsed a standard of substantial
likelihood that the statements will prejudice an adjudicative pro-
ceeding and not the reasonable likelihood" standard which ap-
peared to be the basis for the court's April 16 Order.269 Counsel
for McVeigh argued that they were the only ones who would pro-
tect McVeigh's interest in the public forum, and that, as jury se-
lection indicated, previous statements in the public forum had not
prejudiced public opinion on the side of the defendants. McVeigh
Id at 760-61.
McVeigh, 931 F Supp at 761.
Transcript of April 26, 1997, hearing at 5176, United States v McVeigh, 964 F Supp
313 (D Colo 1997) (No 97-X-29) ("Apr 26, 1997 Transcript"). Nichols contended that this
was an important factor in this case because the government's opening statement "ties the
possession of literature that contains anti-government views to the motive that a person
allegedly acts upon .... We think [this] deserves airing in the court of public opinion."
Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5178-79.
Id at 5185.
90 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1998:
argued that pursuant to ABA Model Rule 3.6, the court should
give him the right of reply and trust that jurors would refrain
from reading what the court had instructed them to avoid."'
In response, the government argued that the court had al-
ready gone beyond Gentile's constitutional requirements by al-
lowing the defense the right to speak in the "court of public opin-
ion" in the pretrial stage of the case. In addition, the government
contended that the right of reply should be exercised in the court-
room and not outside. The government argued that there were
enough legal analysts to explain the proceedings to the public and
that counsel had no First Amendment right to discuss the case
outside the courtroom. The government pointed out that al-
though the jurors were instructed to avoid the publicity in the
case, they might see an occasional headline. Therefore, they ar-
gued, the court should ensure that such headlines were not based
on counsels' comments, which might influence jurors. Finally,
the government argued that the press had no First Amendment
right to know who the witnesses were and when they would tes-
tif.
2 71
Media representatives 27 2 petitioned the court to vacate the
order on the grounds that it violated their First Amendment
rights by impairing their ability to gather news.2 7 3 The media
contended that the right to empanel an impartial jury could not
justify the gag order, since the jurors had already been seated. 4
Relying on Avirgan v Hull 75 the media further argued that
speculation about the possibility of prejudicial publicity interfer-
ing with either side's fair trial rights was not sufficient justifica-
tion for a "gag order" when a case had already received tremen-
dous publicity.2'6 The media, therefore, sought specific on-the-
record findings establishing how the gag order would protect
McVeigh's Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial, and why there
Id at 5186-91.
Id at 5191-5202.
Colorado-Oklahoma Trial Group and the Colorado-Oklahoma Print Media Groups
("Media Representatives").
' Memorandum Brief in Support of Media Representatives' Petition for the Court to
Vacate its April 16, 1997 Order Prohibiting Out of Court Comments and to Remove Re-
strictions on Public Information about Seated Jurors at 3 n 2, 4, United States v McVeigh,
964 F Supp 313 (D Colo 1997) (No 97-X-29) ("Media Representatives Brief), citing CBS,
Inc v Young, 522 F2d 234, 241 (6th Cir 1975) (gag order unconstitutional as it interfered
with media's First Amendment rights); In re Dow Jones & Co, 842 F2d 603 (2d Cir 1988)
(media's First Amendment right to publish affected by court's gag order).
"4 Media Representatives Brief at 9.
118 FRD 252 (D DC 1987).
'5 Media Representatives Brief at 7-10, citingAvirgan, 118 FRD at 254 n 4.
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were no less restrictive means available. 7 Additionally, the me-
dia argued that the gag order would not prevent dissemination of
prejudicial information, but instead would "result in the media
being forced to rely on off-the-record comments, second-hand
sources, and rank speculation, instead of being able to obtain in-
formation from individuals who may have direct knowledge of a
particular circumstance."278 Moreover, the media argued that no
less restrictive means were considered by the court (such as ad-
monishment of the jury),"9 that the order was not narrowly tai-
lored,"0 and that the gag order did not specify a durational
limit."8 The media also objected to the breadth of the order and
asked that any order entered by the court be restricted to the
parties and their counsel. Finally, the media argued that the
public has an interest in comments concerning the proceedings so
that it may remain informed of court activities.2
The court rejected McVeigh's and the media's requests in its
Memorandum Opinion and Order entered May 12, 1997.' The
court found that "the difficulty with a modification of the order to
grant such a right of reply is the impossibility of providing an
acceptable definition of the scope of the exception. " " The court,
however, did not foreclose the possibility of allowing a public re-
ply if the circumstances warranted it in order to protect the fair-
ness of the proceedings. In such a case, the parties could request
relief from the order."5 In upholding its modified order, the court
again relied upon Gentile, but in this instance the court focused
on Justice Rehnquist's argument "that advocates may be re-
strained when there is a substantial likelihood of material preju-
dice to the proceedings."' In light of the fact that jurors would
not be sequestered, the court stated:
This case calls for a blanket bar on out of court comments
See Media Representatives Brief at 7-16.
Id at 10-11.
Id at 11-12, citing In re New York Times, 878 F2d 67, 68 (2d Cir 1989).
2S Media Representatives Brief at 13-14, citing State ex rel NBC, Inc v Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Lake County, 556 NE2d 1120, 1124 (Ohio 1990); New York Times Co v Roth-
wax, 143 A2d 592 (NY App 1988).
' Media Representatives Brief at 11-16.
April 26, 1997 Transcript at 5168-72.
United States v McVeigh, 964 F Supp 313 (D Colo 1997).
Id at 316; Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5171, 5200, 5205. The court expressed con-
cern about what a narrowly-tailored order would say as the case law did not give guid-
ance.
McVeigh, 964 F Supp at 316-17.
Id at 316, quoting Gentile, 501 US at 1075.
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because no lesser restriction would adequately protect
against a substantial likelihood of prejudicing the pro-
ceedings. As noted in the April 16th order, statements
from the prosecutors, defense counsel, government offi-
cials, and agents having official responsibilities relevant to
this case, the defendant and court personnel, may be ex-
pected to be perceived quite differently by jurors acciden-
tally exposed to them. The compelling interest is the pro-
tection of jurors from being influenced by any such state-
ments which may break through the barriers constructed
by them under the courfes instructions. 7
Although the court admonished jurors to avoid all publicity
about the case, it was concerned that jurors might inadvertently
see or hear "some headline or broadcast teaser." If that informa-
tion were not based on comments by counsel or any one else par-
ticipating in the trial, the court reasoned, the potential for preju-
dice would be lessened.' In support of his "blanket bar" on ex-
trajudicial statements, Judge Matsch revisited the pervasive
publicity of the case, defense counsel's efforts to counteract it, and
the ultimate decision to implement the first gag order. 9 The
court made a distinction between restrictions on comments prior
to trial, in which defense attorneys have a right to defend their
client in the court of public opinion, and comments made during
trial when those concerns are not as viable." The court, having
observed that [unirestricted by any rules of relevance or reli-
ability, and energized by entrepreneurial motivation, reporters
and journalists have continued to follow all leads. Nothing in the
subject order restricts that activity,"291 rejected the media's argu-
ments. In addition, the court found that the public would be in-
formed adequately by the media's presence in the courtroom, the
auxiliary court, and the press room, in which proceedings and the
transcripts would be available.29
McVeigh, 964 F Supp at 316.
Id.
Id at 314-15.
Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5176.
McVeigh, 964 F Supp at 314.
Id at 316; Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5172.
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IV. SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE BASED ON
PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
All of the previous attempts by Judge Matsch to ensure a fair
trial and empanel an impartial jury for McVeigh in the face of
pervasive publicity were defeated a month prior to the start of the
trial. On February 28, 1997, after jury notices had been sent
out, 93 The Dallas Morning News published an incendiary article
on its Internet home page asserting that it had "lawfully" ob-
tained internal defense documents that purported to reveal that
McVeigh had confessed to the bombing of the Murrah Building
and that he intended to achieve a "body count." 9  The content of
this article was repeated and debated daily in the Denver area by
way of local television news, national news, radio programs, the
Denver Post, and the Rocky Mountain News, for eleven consecu-
tive daysY5
On March 11, 1997, Playboy Magazine additionally published
an in-depth article on its Internet home page that purported to be
based upon a "lawfully" obtained sixty-page chronology prepared
by the defense recounting McVeigh's story of how he had carried
out the bombing.' This article also was repeated extensively in
the Denver area. In addition, the story of the "confession" was
the focus of the March 12, 1997, broadcast of ABC's Prime Time
Live, in which Ben Fenwick, author of the Playboy article, was
interviewed.297 Parts of the "chronology" were published on the
program.29 ' Again on March 13, 1997, Fenwick discussed the con-
tent of his article and McVeigh's "confession" on ABC's Good
' The jury notices, mailed February 14, 1997, stated that the recipient had been
selected for possible service in the trial of Timothy James McVeigh, who was charged with
the Oklahoma City bombing. The Notice contained a mild admonition to avoid publicity
that might interfere with the ability to be open-minded, but did not prohibit jurors from
reading articles or watching news broadcasts concerning the case. Jury Notice of Febru-
ary 14, 1997, United States v McVeigh, 964 F Supp 313 (D Colo 1997) (No 97-X-29).
Associated Press, Newspaper Says McVeigh Admitted to Bombing, Pantagraph A3
(Bloomington, IL) (Mar 1, 1997).
See, for example, Lynn Bartels, McVeigh "Confession"A Question of Ethics, Rocky
Mountain News 29A (Mar 9, 1997); Howard Pankratz, Defense Files Viewed by Others,
Denver Post A1O (Mar 4, 1997); Paper Says McVeigh Admitted to Bombing, (ABC televi-
sion broadcast, Feb 28, 1997); Dallas Morning News Says Timothy McVeigh Confessed to
Bombing, (NBC television broadcast, Feb 28, 1997); Newspaper Reports McVeigh Admitted
Role in Oklahoma City Bombing (CNN television broadcast, Feb 28, 1997).
For the hardcopy version of this article, see Ben Fenwick, The Road to Oklahoma
City; Timothy McVeigh's Alleged Bombing Plot, 44 Playboy Magazine 70 (June, 1997).
Terror Timeline (NBC television broadcast, Mar 12, 1990).
Id.
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Morning America, NBC's Today Show, and the CBS Morning
News.2"
As a result of the immeasurably prejudicial impact of the re-
ports and with the start of the trial only seventeen days away,
McVeigh moved on March 14, 1997, to dismiss with prejudice, or
in the alternative to abate the trial for at least one year, or
change venue."° In support of the motion, McVeigh submitted to
the court fifty-two articles which appeared in Denver area news-
papers from March 1, 1997, to March 13, 1997,"°l and eighty tran-
scripts of local and national television broadcasts in Denver be-
tween February 28, 1997, and March 14, 1997.02 McVeigh con-
tended that no matter what source jurors used for news, they had
to have seen the reports of the "confession." There is no question
that a defendant's confession is the most damaging evidence to a
defendant at trial,..3 and highly prejudicial when published prior
to trial."°  McVeigh maintained that to proceed to trial under
these circumstances would violate his Fifth Amendment right to
New McVeigh Confession Document (ABC television broadcast, Mar 13, 1997); Ben
Fenwick, Playboy Magazine, Discusses Article He Wrote that Timothy McVeigh Confessed
to His Attorneys that He Alone Carried Out Bombing in Oklahoma City (NBC television
broadcast, Mar 13, 1997); Playboy Magazine Reports Timothy McVeigh Confessed to His
Lawyers that He Planted the Bomb at the Murrah Building (CBS Morning News, Mar 12,
1997).
' See Defendant McVeigh's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alterna-
tive, Request for Abatement or Other Relief, with Supporting Memorandum of Law (under
seal) at 14, United States v McVeigh, 955 F Supp 1281 (D Colo 1997) (No 96-CR-68-M)
("McVeigh Motion to Dismiss").
"' See Pete Slover, Bomb Case Shocker: Leaked Report in Dallas Paper Says Suspect
McVeigh Confessed to Bombing, Rocky Mountain News 1, 2A (Mar 1, 1997); Guy Kelly,
McVeigh's Reported Admission of Responsibility for Bombing Astonishes Denver Attorneys,
Rocky Mountain News 4A (Mar 1, 1997); Chance Conner, et al, Bombing Trial in Turmoil,
Denver Post 1 (Mar 1, 1997); Lou Kilzer and Kevin Flynn, The Case Against McVeigh:
Timothy McVeigh's Purported Admission that He Committed the Oklahoma City Bombing
May Be Inadmissible at His Trial, Beginning March 31st in Denver. Here's How the Prose-
cution and Defense Assess the Evidence the Jury Will Hear, Rocky Mountain News 20A
(Mar 2, 1997); Paper: Suspect Timed Blast to Boost Deaths, Denver Post lA, 14A (Mar 2,
1997).
3 For example, on February 28, 1997, at 5:00 pm, ABC affiliate KMGH reported that
"Timothy McVeigh had admitted to his lawyers that he bombed the Oklahoma City Fed-
eral Building .... We start with the shocking news in the Oklahoma City Bombing case.
The respected newspaper says he not only admitted to the bombing but also said his goal
was a body count." (KMGH broadcast Feb 28, 1997). And on March 1, at 4:00pm, NBC
affiliate KUSA reported that "[iun Colorado today, where the jury will be picked for the
Oklahoma City bombing case, it was hard to avoid the saturation coverage of Timothy
McVeigh's jailhouse confession." (KUSA broadcast Mar 1, 1997).
3 Parker v Randolph, 442 US 62, 72 (1979) ("The defendant is 'the most knowledge-
able and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct,'.., and one can
scarcely imagine evidence more damaging to his defense than his own admission of
guilt."), quoting Bruton v United States, 391 US 123, 140 (1968) (White dissenting).
' United States v Thompson, 908 F2d 648, 650 (10th Cir 1990).
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due process of law and his Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial by an impartial jury. °5 McVeigh likened reports of his "con-
fession" to the defendant's televised confession in Rideau v Lou-
isiana3" and to the reported confession of the defendant in the
midst of devastating pretrial publicity in Coleman v Kempt. °7
McVeigh argued that remedial measures must go beyond juror
assurances of impartiality and strong court admonishments that
jurors must consider only the evidence at trial. The government's
position in response was that any prejudicial impact of the al-
leged "confession" could be determined during voir dire.
The court entered its order just three days later, on March
17, 1997."' Judge Matsch found that based on his past experi-
ence with jurors and pretrial publicity, the prejudicial articles
"have had neither the wide exposure or general acceptance that
the Defendant's lawyers presume."3 9 The court noted that the
case had already produced "prodigious" amounts of publicity ex-
ploring all aspects of the case and that the publication of sensa-
tional stories as trial beckoned was a natural aspect of competi-
tive journalism.310 The court believed that its previous efforts to
ensure both foundational and fundamental fairness for McVeigh
had not been destroyed by the publication of his "confession."
Looking at the two stories and the publicity surrounding them in
the "full context of all that has been said and done in connection
with this case," the court held that the jurors could still decide
the case purely on the evidence fully presented and contested at
trial and those potential jurors who could not do so would be
weeded out during voir dire.31" '
Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 729-30 (1961) (Frankfurter concurring):
These rudimentary conditions for determining guilt are inevitably want-
ing if the jury which is to sit in judgement of a fellow human being come
to its task with its mind eradicably poisoned against him. How can falli-
ble men and women reach a disinterested verdict based exclusively on
what they heard in court when, before they entered the jury box, their
minds were saturated by press and radio for months preceding by matter
designed to establish the guilt of the accused? A conviction so secured
obviously constitutes a denial of due process of law in its most rudimen-
tary conception.
373 US 723 (1963).
778 F2d 1487 (11th Cir 1985).
United States v McVeigh, 955 F Supp 1281 (D Colo 1997).
Id.
... Id at 1281-82.
" Id.
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On March 25, 1997, McVeigh filed his second request for re-
lief based upon the pretrial publicity.112 On March 27, 1997,
Judge Matsch denied the Motion without a hearing, without a
response from the government, and without oral argument."3
V. ARRANGEMENTS
In the meantime, the issue had arisen of how to accommo-
date, in a fair, organized, and dignified manner, the needs of the
plethora of media representatives who would converge upon the
Denver Federal Courthouse. Judge Matsch made several at-
tempts to satisfy their needs with minimal disruption to the trial
proceedings.
First, in the courtroom itself, television monitors were set up
facing the public area that displayed exhibits as they were intro-
duced and explained by witnesses. Judge Matsch then reserved
approximately half the courtroom seating for the press. He made
it very clear that once the doors to the courtroom closed no one
would be allowed to leave except during recesses. Those who
could not find seating, and members of the press and public who
wanted the freedom to come and go as needed, could sit in an ad-
joining auxiliary courtroom that carried a live audio feed of the
proceedings. A special "press room" was established in a building
adjacent to the main courthouse in order to provide logistical
support services to all news organizations. At first, there was no
audio-feed to this room, but after an incident discussed in Part
VI, in which audiotapes of the proceedings were given to the
press and then used as sound bites on the news, an audio-feed
was established for the press room as well. No recording of the
proceedings was allowed in either room. Outside the courthouse,
an expansive section of the plaza was cordoned so that the media
could set up camera stands to broadcast their reports, and so that
those who wanted to speak to the press could do so.314
VI. MEDIA ACCESS TO COURT TAPES - BROADCASTING"
At a hearing held April 9, 1996, audiotapes of the court pro-
ceedings were first taken from the courtroom as they were com-
32 Defendant McVeigh's Motion for Continuance and Other Relief, Request for Evi-
dentiary Hearing, With Supporting Memorandum of Law (Under Seal), United States v
McVeigh, 931 F Supp 756 (D Colo 1996) (No 96-CR-68-M).
313 Transcript of March 27, 1997, hearing at. 4, United States v McVeigh, 931 F Supp
756 (D Colo 1996) (No 96-CR-68-M) ("Mar 27, 1997 Transcript").
34 Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5123-25.
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pleted and then copied and sold by the clerk's office while the
hearing was still in progress. The media played portions of the
tapes to the public that same day. The media then petitioned the
court to allow an audio-feed to the press room in order for the
press to make its own copies of the courtroom proceedings. Nich-
ols objected to the audio-feed to the press room and moved the
court to stop distribution of the tapes.
Representatives of the media petitioned the court to allow an
audio-feed to the press room, as in the auxiliary court room, sub-
ject to an electronic system that would allow the court to inter-
rupt or delay the signal. The media contended that this would
reduce the number of seats taken by the press in the auxiliary
court room, allow the media to make its own copies of the tapes in
a more timely manner, and reduce the "clamor" of multiple news
organizations trying to get the tapes from the Court Clerk's
office.315 If the court would not allow the media to dub its own
tapes, it requested that the court continue the practice of distrib-
uting the tapes to the media and public. The media argued that
the tapes were the most accurate record of the proceedings and
allowed the public to hear the voice tone and inflection of the
speakers, which would provide the basis for a listener to make a
more searching evaluation of the record's content.3 16 The media
argued that its problems of accuracy and timing outweighed the
court's reluctance to provide it with both voices and words."1
Nichols objected to the distribution of the audiotapes, ob-
jected to an audio-feed to the press room, and objected to the me-
dia making its own tapes from an audio transmission. First,
Nichols argued that whether the media waited minutes or an af-
ternoon to play the tapes it would have the same effect as if
broadcasting them contemporaneously with the hearing in viola-
tion of Rule 53.3"' Next, Nichols argued that the media, like the
public, has a right only to sit in the courtroom and listen or report
what transpires, so no constitutional considerations existed."9
... Transcript of May 1, 1996, hearing at 107, United States V McVeigh, 931 F Supp
753 (D Colo 1996) (No 96-CR-68-M) ("May 1, 1996 Transcript").
3,6 Id at 112.
3" Id at 112-13.
FRCrP 53 provides that "radio broadcasting from the courtroom shall not be per-
mitted by the court." See May 1, 1996 Transcript at 115; Terry Nichols' Opposition to
Media Representatives' Petition Regarding Live Audio-Feed and Motion to Stop Distribu-
tion of Audio-Tapes of Court Proceedings at 4, United States v McVeigh, 931 F Supp 753
(D Colo 1996) (No 96-CR-68-M) ("Nichols Opposition Brief'), citing United States v Ed-
wards, 785 F2d 1293 (5th Cir 1986) and United States v Hastings, 695 F2d 1278 (11th Cir
1983).
3"9 Nichols Opposition Brief at 10, citing Nixon v Warner Communications, Inc, 435 US
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Nichols contended that the right of access was not implicated be-
cause the media had access to the written transcripts that consti-
tuted the official record in this case.32 Consequently, the public's
rights were met by the media's ability to transcribe what was
said in the courtroom and report it immediately thereafter,
checking the accuracy a few hours later when the transcript
would be provided." 1 Furthermore, Nichols argued that if audio-
tapes were distributed, they would affect both witnesses and at-
torneys in the courtroom and would increase the amount of pub-
licity outside the courtroom without gaining any informational
benefit. Relying on Estes v Texas 2. and Chandler v Florida,"
Nichols also proposed that, although difficult to show, distribu-
tion of the tapes would distort the behavior of witnesses and
counsel and likely intimidate some witnesses.324 Releasing the
audiotapes would work to "fan the flames" of publicity as the me-
dia would repeatedly replay the voice of the speaker, editing to
find the most inflammatory statements." In support of this ar-
gument, Nichols directed the court to the sound bite taken from
the April 9 hearing, in which prosecutor Beth Wilkinson's preju-
dicial and inflammatory in-court comment that the government
has "no information showing anyone but Nichols and McVeigh
were the masterminds of this bombing," which was repeatedly
played on the news that evening.326 Thus, the excessive media
coverage would violate the defendants' fair trial rights, which a
court must take steps to protect under Sheppard v Maxwell. 327
The government's position was almost identical to Nichols's.
The government argued that since the tapes were not the official
record, distribution of them to the press amounted to broadcast-
ing in violation of Rule 53." The press usually had to wait only a
couple of hours before the written transcript became available, so
589, 610 (1978).
' The written transcripts, not the audiotapes, were kept as the official record in this
case. The tapes were made only to assist the court reporter as a backup device. See May
1, 1996 Transcript at 111-12 and 116-17.
3" Nichols Opposition Brief at 11, quoting Estes v Texas, 381 US 532, 542 (1965)
('[R]eporters of all media, including television, are always present if they wish to be and
are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court through their respective media").
381 US 532 (1965).
.. 449 US 560 (1981).
34 Nichols Opposition Brief at 5-10.
May 1, 1996 Transcript at 115, 119-20, 122.
Nichols Opposition Brief at 2.
May 1, 1996 Transcript at 114, citing Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333 (1966).
May 1, 1996 Transcript at 124-25.
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timing was not an issue. 29 However, the effect upon the wit-
nesses of knowledge that their testimony could be heard by mil-
lions of people, and the fact that witnesses who had not yet testi-
fied could hear the tapes, posed problems.33 The government ar-
gued that the tapes would impair the dignity and decorum of the
proceedings both inside and outside the courtroom. 1 The gov-
ernment was also concerned that allowing the tapes to be distrib-
uted to the press was in direct conflict with the intended purpose
of the Anti-Terrorist Act,332 which specifically allows for closed
circuit television for victims as an exception to Rule 53. The gov-
ernment proposed that Rule 53 would not be violated if an audio
transmission were sent to the press room, as long as it could not
be recorded or broadcast and the tapes were no longer distrib-
uted. 3
At first, McVeigh took a balanced position which simply in-
formed the court of both the positive and negative aspects of al-
lowing the re-broadcasting'of the tapes.' Later, McVeigh sided
with Nichols's position that distribution of the audiotapes
amounted to broadcasting in violation of Rule 53 and that the
media had neither a common law nor First Amendment right of
access to the tapes, as they were not the official record of the pro-
ceedings and distribution would only impair the fair trial rights
of the defendants through inflammatory sound bites. 5 McVeigh
took the position that if an audio feed was sent to the press room,
the media should not be allowed to tape it."3
On May 29, 1996, the court ruled that release of the tapes
"resulted in the functional equivalent of a broadcast of the court
Id at 125.
.. Id at 128.
=' Id at 125-27.
See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 18 USc § 2255
(1994 & supp 1998).
May 1, 1996 Transcript at 128-29.
Id at 131-38. Keeping in mind that reports would appear in print, McVeigh noted
that the audiotapes could influence witnesses and adversely affect the defendants by
broadcasting evidence or statements that may have been ruled inadmissible. However,
McVeigh did not share the fears of the government and Nichols that the trial might turn
into a "media circus." Instead, McVeigh acknowledged the public's curiosity and need to
learn what happened - if in fact the case would reveal that - and to understand an
unprecedented event in history.
' See Defendant Timothy McVeigh's Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Directed to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Hon. Richard P.
Matsch at 4-10, Colorado-Oklahoma Media Representatives v Honorable Richard P.
Matsch, No 96-1292 (10th Cir July 9, 1996) (order denying writ of mandamus) ("Order of
July 9, 1996").
' May 1, 1996 Transcript at 132-37.
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proceedings in violation of Rule 53." " Although Congress modi-
fied Rule 53 by allowing federal courts to use an electronic court
recorder (CECRW) and maintain the tapes as the official record
available for sale to the public,"' the tapes could not be sold if
they were not the official record.3 9 The court chose mechanical
stenography to maintain the official record in the case, and kept
the audiotapes as a backup method to aid the court reporter.340
The media sought a writ of mandamus on the question of ac-
cess to the audiotapes, which was denied by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals."4 In December, the media sought reconsidera-
tion of the issue of the audio feed to the press room, and the court
finally authorized the transmission on the condition that the me-
dia could not record it.
VII. THE MEDIA'S OBJECTION TO THE JURY Box BARRIER
Before trial began, Judge Matsch directed that a partial bar-
rier be constructed on the public side of the jury boxe for six rea-
sons. First, the barrier would shield potential jurors from the
view of the press during voir dire and thereby protect their iden-
tities and facilitate the kind of candid answers required in this
case.' Second, the barrier would hide the jurors from the small
camera at the entrance of the courtroom.' Third, the barrier
United States v McVeigh, 931 F Supp 753, 755 (D Colo 1996).
28 USC. § 753(b) (1994).
Under Carlisle v United States, a district court may not deviate from the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 517 US 416, 426(1996).
'o McVeigh, 931 F Supp 753.
41 "We have reviewed all filings in this mandamus matter, and have determined that
Judge Matsch acted lawfully and within his discretion." Order of July 9, 1996 at 2. The
media did not raise the issue of the press room audio-feed at that time.
" The barrier started at the back of the box and went up to the top of the wall. It
then curved downward to intersect with the waist high "modesty screen" in front of the
jury box. See Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5115.
During voir dire only, seating for the press was restricted to an area of the court-
room where they could not view the jurors being questioned.
'" Subsequent to the removal of the case from Oklahoma to Colorado, Congress
passed, and the President signed into law the AEDPA, 18 USC § 2255 (1994 & supp 1998)
on April 26, 1996. This Act provided a limited exception to the prohibition of televising
federal court proceedings under FRCrP 53. Pursuant to Section 235 of the Act, Judge
Matsch was required to provide a closed circuit transmittal, by a closed circuit television,
back to Oklahoma. Judge Matsch allowed one camera, in a fixed positioned in a port in
the wall, at the entrance of the courtroom. Section 235 provides, in relevant part:
In General. - Notwithstanding any provision of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to the contrary, in order to permit victims of crime to
watch criminal trial proceedings in cases where the venue of the trial is
changed - (1) out of the State in which the case was initially brought;
and (2) more than 350 miles from the location in which those proceedings
originally would have taken place; the trial court shall order closed cir-
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would obstruct the jurors' view of the camera. Judge Matsch
stated that this would prevent the jury from being distracted and
influenced by the thought of all the people who were watching
who had in some way been victimized by the event. Fourth, the
barrier would prevent courtroom artists from sketching the ju-
rors."4s Fifth, it would prevent the jurors from being influenced
by the audience in the courtroom. 6 And sixth, the barrier would
help the jury stay focused on the participants in the well of the
court.'47 Despite this explanation from the court, the media ob-
jected to the barrier. The media took the position that there ex-
isted no empirical evidence to suggest that cameras in the court-
room influence jurors, and that any such concern in this case
should be lessened by the fact that the camera was barely visible.
The media then argued that less restrictive means could be im-
plemented by the court by ordering sketch artists not to draw ju-
rors and subjecting their sketches to inspection prior to leaving
the courtroom. 48
Both defendants and the government agreed that the barrier
should stay in place. The government took the position that the
court had properly balanced and accommodated all interests in
constructing the barrier and it should remain in place."
McVeigh argued that the barrier was necessary to ensure that
strong emotional feelings were not improperly conveyed to the
cuit televising of the proceedings to that location, for viewing by such
persons the court determined have a compelling interest in doing so and
are otherwise unable to do so by reason of the inconvenience and expense
caused by the change of venue.
AEDPA § 235, 42 USC § 10608 (1994 & Supp 1998). This is not the only time Congress
enacted special legislation for this trial. On March 19, 1997, the President signed into law
the Victim's Rights' Clarification Act of 1997, 18 USC § 3510 (1994 & Supp 1998), which
provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Capital Cases. - Notwithstanding any statute, rule, or other provi-
sion of law, a United States district court shall not order any victim of an
offense excluded from the trial of a defendant accused of that offense be-
cause such victim may, during the sentencing hearing, testify as to the ef-
fect of the offense on the victim and the victim's family or as to any other
factor for which notice is required under section 3593(a).
See Order entered March 25, 1997, United States v McVeigh, No 96-CR-68-M. (Order
Amending Order Under Rule 615).
Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5117.
'6 Judge Matsch's concerns were well-founded. He pointed out that there were many
victims in the audience and during testimony many of these individuals had expressed
emotion. Id at 5118.
" Judge Matsch pointed out that many reporters in the audience were "feverishly"
taking notes, potentially distracting the jurors. Id at 5117-18.
Id at 5119.
" Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5123.
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jury." ° Additionally, McVeigh'pointed out to the court that the
media had already corrupted the jury system once in this case by
establishing communication through an intermediary with a
grand juror."' Next, Nichols argued that jurors who may return
an unpopular verdict have historically been protected by the
court.35 2 Moreover, Nichols urged that jurors must be protected
from approaches by outside influences.353
The court denied the petition of the media. In so ruling, the
court noted that the jurors were not completely screened from the
view of the audience. Secondly, the court explained that the cir-
cumstances of every case are different, and in this case the cir-
cumstances called for this design, which reasonably accommo-
dated all the parties' and the public's interests. 3
VIII. THE MEDIA'S ACCESS TO INFORMATION CONCERNING
JURORS
The media also objected to three procedures that occurred
during voir dire. First, jurors were identified by number, not
name, during voir dire.355 Second, the court conducted challenges
for cause in chambers and sealed the transcript. Third, the court
sealed the transcripts of the open voir dire. The court agreed,
however, to unseal the transcripts of voir dire since the jury had
been empaneled without hearing arguments.5
The media argued that the identities of the jurors should not
be kept secret from the public as jury anonymity has been upheld
only to protect the jury from the defendant.357 Moreover, the me-
dia argued that the purpose of an open voir dire would be de-
feated if the public were prevented from correlating information
given during voir dire to the actual jurors empaneled" Further,
once the jury was empaneled, the media objected to continued
sealing of the in-chambers transcripts in which potential jurors
were challenged for cause. Specifically, the media objected to
Id at 5125-26.
3" Id at 5126.
Id at 5127.
Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5127-28.
Id at 5130.
' The court, McVeigh, and the government agreed that the identities of the jurors
should not be made public. Once the jury had been selected, this was accomplished by
referring to all jurors by their assigned seat number.
Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5119.
Id at 5134-35.
Id at 5135.
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blanket sealing of the transcripts.359 The media conceded that if
the privacy rights of an individual were implicated, or if the in-
formation would prejudice the defendants in some manner, then
that part of the transcript should remain sealed. 6 ' However, the
media argued that the First Amendment mandated that the court
examine each transcript rather than imposing a blanket sealing
order.36'
In response, the government argued that the jury should re-
main anonymous and that the court had authority to do so even
when the defendant had shown no threat or risk of influence.6 2
Without taking a position on whether or not the court should un-
seal the transcripts, the government argued that the court had
previously ruled that these conferences were not traditionally
held in public, therefore it was within the court's discretion to
determine if and when the transcripts should be unsealed.3
McVeigh objected to the unsealing of the transcripts.
McVeigh contended that the facts of the case mandated not only
that the jury remain anonymous but that those excused from
service should also remain unidentified. Based on an incident in
which the press disclosed the identity of a grand juror, he argued
that there was a "substantial likelihood" that such an incident
could occur again."' In addition, McVeigh expressed concern that
if a juror were excused during the trial, past experience demon-
strated that the juror would be approached by the media, result-
ing in information about the case becoming public while the trial
was still in progress.3  Moreover, McVeigh pointed out that
many of the potential jurors expressed concern about their identi-
ties being made public both in jury questionnaires and directly to
the court, because they had to relate very personal information
during voir dire.3" Because the press had already published
many of those personal details, unsealing the names would only
allow the press to match identities with specific statements.
McVeigh argued that there is no First Amendment right to this
type of information and that the court should not facilitate the
release of such information.3 6' Finally, McVeigh argued that the
Id.
Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5135-36.
Id at 5131-37.
See United States v Branch, 91 F3d 699 (5th Cir 1996).
Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5137-39.
Id at 5140.
Id at 5140-41.
Id at 5141-42.
Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5142-43.
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transcripts of the challenges for cause should remain sealed. In
support of this position, McVeigh argued that both the govern-
ment and defense conducted frank discussions about the indi-
viduals whom each challenged and that such information should
remain sealed until the trial concluded."c
Nichols joined the government and McVeigh in arguing that
the jury should remain anonymous. In addressing the challenges
for cause transcripts, Nichols argued that the transcripts should
remain sealed until the end of the trial in accordance with the
criteria established in the court's January 24, 1996, Order.369
The court entered its ruling after making on-the-record
findings balancing the defendants' First, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rights in accordance with its January 24, 1996, Or-
der, and giving additional consideration to the privacy interests
of the jurors. Judge Matsch explained that jurors' privacy inter-
ests should be considered "in terms of their required participation
in this process."' ° Turning to the five relevant questions, the
court found that jury selection, and particularly jury identifica-
tion, had traditionally been open to the public. However, it was
"questionable that public discussion about who is on the jury in
the course of the trial would significantly advance any positive
interest that anybody has a fair trial."3 7 ' In determining whether
disclosure to serve the interest of public access would prejudice
some higher value interest, the court discussed several factors.
The first consideration was the media's involvement during the
course of the grand jury investigation. 2 Second, the court was
concerned for the safety of the jurors given that the indictment
had charged others unknown, that many people had voiced strong
feelings concerning what the outcome of the trial should be, and
Id at 5143-44.
Id at 5144-48. Nichols argued that jury selection and the grounds for challenges
are traditionally open, but that the tradition of openness concerning the hearings on
challenges is mixed. Nichols argued that knowing the grounds upon which jurors may be
properly challenged and dismissed plays a significant positive role in the process and is an
important public concern. However, the last three questions concerning whether there are
higher values that may be prejudiced by disclosure, whether protection of these values
overrides the qualified First Amendment right of access, and whether disclosure is essen-
tial considering all reasonable alternatives, are all answered in such a way as to require
non-disclosure. Nichols argued that to release the information prior to the end of the trial
would be to arouse "speculation and comment' by the media that could become known to
the unsequestered jury and invite the risk of influencing the trial. Therefore, disclosing
such information at the end of the trial would accommodate the public's qualified First
Amendment rights and still protect the integrity of the trial.
Id at 5152.
Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5154.
Id at 5154-55.
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that the massive publicity could encourage someone to engage in
a sensational act or in disrupting the proceedings."' Third, the
court noted that many jurors expressed concern about disclosure
of their identities, both on the jury questionnaires and during
voir dire. 4 Although the court did not decide that juror privacy
was a constitutionally protected right, it was a matter of concern.
The court then noted that many of the answers given during voir
dire had been reported with efforts to link juror views to their
statements.37" 5 The court found that any additional identification
would likely result in the media "attempting to predict how par-
ticular jurors might respond to particular tactics in the course of
the trial and to the approaches taken by counsel" and that they
should not be subjected to having their "psyches" publicly exam-
ined by the media.376 The court explained that these needs over-
rode the qualified First Amendment right of access because "what
th[e] jury does with respect to the evidence that's presented to it
and its ability to deal fairly and impartially with that evidence
and focus on it is of primary importance and overrides all other
considerations." 7
The court, on the basis of these considerations, concluded
that closure was necessary because the jury would not be seques-
tered (the court had previously determined that sequestration of
the jury would have a "very damaging effect on their ability to
serve in this case").37 The court then ruled to keep the challenges
for cause transcripts sealed. In reaching this decision, the court
stated that the interests to be protected were the rights of the
court, the defendant, and the government to "freely express their
interpretations of the voir dire" and the right "to bring into the
discussion of challenges for cause... things that may be known
apart from the voir dire about a particular person, and the right
to characterize such things as credibility of some of the re-
sponses."379 The court found that to fully exercise this right, the
transcript must be sealed "at least during the course of the trial
in which the empaneled jury is going to judge the case." °
Id at 5155-57.
" Id at 5157-58.
'" Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5158.
Id at 5159.
Id.
'" Id at 5159-60.
Apr 26, 1997 Transcript at 5160-61.
"o Id at 5161. The court determined that the value to be gained by going through the
transcript and analyzing each individual who was challenged was minimal compared to
the detriment of taking time away from the trial to analyze the transcript.
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CONCLUSION
Following McVeigh's conviction, there appeared to be, at
least judging by media content, overwhelming public acceptance
of the jury's verdict and the imposition of the death penalty.
Many contrasted McVeigh's guilty verdict and death sentence
with the acquittal of O.J. Simpson. Many people presumed that
both men were guilty, but Simpson, for whatever reason, had es-
caped conviction.
That the media would believe that the public accepted the
verdict and McVeigh's trial is hardly surprising. The media had
helped shape that verdict. Early on the media gave dramatic
coverage of the aftermath of the bombing, the recovery and rescue
efforts, and the memorial funeral services at the State Fair-
ground, all of which unquestionably fell into the category of le-
gitimate news reporting. After McVeigh's arrest, however, the
constant repetition of false, misleading, or incomplete stories
about McVeigh, his background, political associates, alleged po-
litical views, and claims that the evidence against him was
"overwhelming," was orchestrated, in my opinion, by the Depart-
ment of Justice. Right or wrong, that's the defense's viewpoint.
In some of the footnotes in this article I have pointed out a
few of the most egregious examples of false, misleading, and in-
complete reporting. Long before the first witness was summoned,
the presumption of innocence had been replaced by the assump-
tion of guilt. The defense lacked adequate resources to combat
the overwhelming media prejudice. Had Judge Matsch entered a
gag order immediately upon the arrest of McVeigh, the result
might have been different. As it was, no gag order was entered
for more than six months, and by that time, the cumulative effect
of the prejudice had been so great that a change of venue was re-
quired.
Notwithstanding this development, the defense felt, thirty
days before trial, that there was a substantial chance of
McVeigh's acquittal. Whatever chance there was went out the
window after the false reports of a McVeigh "confession." From
an examination of answers to juror questionnaires and voir dire,
21 percent of the 351 potential jurors specifically stated that they
knew or had read about the "confession," knew McVeigh had
"admitted guilt," or had heard about the Playboy and Dallas
Morning News reports. Twenty-nine of these potential jurors
stated bluntly that McVeigh was guilty. Eight potential jurors,
influenced by the court's admonitions regarding publicity, stated
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that they had heard about a possible delay in the trial or a
change of venue, making it difficult to assess what they actually
knew. Combining these two groups, at least 23 percent of the
potential jurors knew about the reports of the alleged confession.
Furthermore, during individual voir dire, twenty-six more poten-
tial jurors hesitantly admitted that they had some knowledge of
the "confession." In all, 106 potential jurors, or 30 percent, ad-
mitted that they had knowledge of the "confession." One can
safely assume that this number would be higher had all the pro-
spective jury members been subject to individual voir dire. Of the
potential jurors, 132 (38 percent) had predispositions concerning
McVeigh. In total, at least 49 percent of the potential jurors were
strongly affected by the publicity about the case and could not be
considered impartial." This prejudicial publicity is nowhere bet-
ter demonstrated than in the report made to the court by one of
the jurors that another juror had stated, "I think we all know
what the verdict should be.""'
There is little doubt that Judge Matsch bent over backward
prior to February 28, 1996, to give the Defendant a fair trial. He
granted the defendant's request for a change of venue, request for
separate trials, and numerous motions to suppress, exclude, or
limit evidence. He also authorized full financing for the defense.
He, however, like everyone else, was overwhelmed by the events
after February 28. While before that date, Judge Matsch's posi-
tion had been to caution the lawyers repeatedly not to talk about
the case outside the courtroom because it might influence the
jury, once he was confronted with the February 28 Dallas Morn-
ing News story, his attitude changed to one of belief that jurors
could disregard what they read. The defense could not share his
optimism. The Dallas Morning News and Playboy stories robbed
the verdict of historical credibility. One will never know whether
the jury convicted McVeigh on the evidence and pursuant to the
court's instructions, or whether they carried with them to the
jury room what had been drummed into their minds for the two
and one-half years before they were seated, especially the reports
of the "confession" thirty days before the trial began.
" This analysis is drawn from McVeigh's Motion for New Trial, Request for Eviden-
tiary Hearing and Memorandum in Support (Under Seal) at 1-42, United States u
McVeigh, No 96-CR-68-M (D Colo 1996) ("McVeigh Motion for New Trial").
See McVeigh Motion for New Trial at 44, quoting Trial Transcript, Volume 92 at
84941.15-84951.10, United States v McVeigh, No 96-CR-68-M (D Colo 1996) (emphasis
added).
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The prophylactic measures that Judge Matsch implemented
withstood challenge, were generally supported by the three par-
ties to the lawsuit, and represented reasoned approaches to an
extraordinary set of circumstances. Unfortunately, they came too
late to achieve justice.
